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Conventional wisdom in banking argues that diversification tends to reduce bank risk and im-
prove performance, but the recent financial crisis suggests that aggressive diversification strate-
gies may have resulted in increased risk taking and poor performance.  This paper addresses this 
important question by evaluating the empirical relationship between diversification strategies and 
the risk-return tradeoff in banking.  Our data set covers Russian banks during the 1999-2006 pe-
riod and finds somewhat mixed results.  Specifically, we find that banks’ performance tends to 
be non-monotonically related to their diversification strategy. The marginal effects of focus in-
dices (inverse measures of diversification) on performance are nonlinearly associated with the 
level of risk and foreign ownership. A focused strategy is found to be associated with increased 
profit and decreased risk only up to a certain threshold. Additionally, when foreign ownership is 
either very high or very low, banks tend to benefit more from being diversified. This analysis 
provides important strategic and policy implications for bank managers and regulators in Russia 
as well as in other emerging economies. 
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Pankkien diversifikaation on yleisesti oletettu laskevan pankkien riskiä ja parantavan tuloksia. Ko-
kemukset viimeaikaisesta finanssikriisistä viittaavat kuitenkin siihen, että aggressiivinen diversifi-
kaatio on saattanut lisätä riskinottoa ja heikentää tuloksia. Tässä tutkimuksessa käsitellään tätä tär-
keää kysymystä ja arvioidaan pankkien diversifikaation sekä riskin ja tuoton välistä yhteyttä. Ai-
neisto kattaa venäläiset pankit vuosina 1999–2006. Tutkimustulosten mukaan diversifikaation sekä 
pankkien tulosten välinen yhteys ei ole monotoninen. Keskittymisindeksien marginaalinen vaikutus 
pankkien tuloksiin vaihtelee epälineaarisesti riskitason ja ulkomaisen omistuksen suhteen. Toimin-
nan keskittäminen nostaa voittoja ja laskee riskiä ainoastaan tiettyyn tasoon asti. Kun ulkomainen 
omistus on joko tarpeeksi pientä tai suurta, pankit hyötyvät toimintansa diversifikaatiosta. Tulokset 
ovat tärkeitä pankeille ja pankkivalvojille, jotka toimivat Venäjällä ja muilla kehittyvillä markki-
noilla. 
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1  Introduction  
 
Conventional wisdom in banking argues that diversification tends to reduce bank risk and improve 
performance. In contrast, the recent worldwide financial crisis raises serious concerns among legis-
lators, regulators, practitioners, and academics as to whether banking institutions have outgrown 
their optimal scope and whether aggressive diversification strategies may have led some banks to be 
exposed to much higher risk instead of lower risk. This question is important because it not only 
demands ex post evaluations of the economic impacts of changes in legislation and regulatory envi-
ronment on the banking industry, which might provide an exogenous motive for banks to diversify, 
but it also mandates careful investigation of the effects of diversification strategies on the risk-
return tradeoff of banking institutions. 
Existing studies of the performance effects of bank diversification, although many in num-
ber, have not yet come to a consensus. Moreover, most of these studies are based on a simple model 
which assumes a linear relationship between the bank’s risk-return tradeoff and its diversification 
strategy (Acharya et al. 2006 is an exception). Ignoring the possibility that a bank’s risk-return 
tradeoff  might  depend  nonmonotonically  on  its  diversification  strategy  may  be  misleading  and 
could jeopardize the validity of the policy implications of these studies. Moreover, this line of re-
search is heavily saturated in studies that focus on banks in developed markets, while leaving the 
banking industry in emerging and transitional economies largely unexamined (an exception is Ber-
ger et al. (2010)).
2   
We analyze banks in one emerging economy, Russia.  This nation has been characterized 
by a dramatically improving macroeconomic environment, rapid development of its banking sector, 
and changes in banking regulations that have led to lower barriers to foreign investment and acqu i-
sitions. The ongoing structural change of the Russian economy – e.g., the growth of small business 
and entrepreneurial activities – has increased the demand for financial services and led to intensified 
competition in the market. This competition compelled Russian banks to change or to contemplate 
restructuring their asset-liability strategies. With more than 1,000 banking institutions of different 
size, ownership, and business strategy, Russia provides a rich test case for analyzing the impact of 
banks’ diversification strategies on risk-return scenarios. We have been able to obtain highly de-
tailed information on financial variables and ownership particulars of almost all the Russian banks, 
                                                 
2 Berger et al. (2010), which focuses primarily on methodological innovation in estimating the effects of diversification, 
also examines the effects of diversification on the performance of Chinese banks and finds reduced profits and higher 
costs associated with more diversification. Allen N. Berger, Iftekhar Hasan, Iikka Korhonen and  
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which enables us to compute focus indices and construct measures of diversification economies 
based on sub-items within loans, assets, liabilities, etc.  
 This paper specifically investigates the relationship between diversification strategies and 
the risk-return tradeoff in the Russian banking industry over the period from 1999 to 2006.   Diver-
sification is measured in four dimensions: loans, deposits, assets, and liabilities. We evaluate the 
effects of diversification strategy on firm performance based on the concept of economies of diver-
sification developed by Berger et al. (2010) and compare the results to those of the more conven-
tional focus index, which is based on the sum of squares of shares in different bank products. For all 
four dimensions, we find that banks’ performance tends to be nonmonotonically related to diversifi-
cation strategy, and the marginal effects of focus indices on bank performance are also nonlinearly 
associated with level of risk and foreign ownership. Specifically, we find that a bank’s initial move 
towards focus (from a complete diversification strategy) tends to increase the bank’s profits and re-
duce its risk, but that this favorable effect of becoming more focused tends to be reversed when it 
exceeds  a  certain  threshold.  Further,  we  find  that  the  diversification  strategy  tends  to  have  a 
stronger impact on banks’ performance when they operate at higher risk levels. As for the role of 
foreign ownership, our results suggest that there is a range of foreign ownership within which banks 
can benefit most from being focused. When foreign ownership is either relatively high or relatively 
low, banks tend to benefit more from being diversified.   
As noted above, from both policy and research perspectives, it is important to gain a better 
understanding of the sustainability of current practices and the successes of financial intermediaries 
regarding their diversification strategies. Given the global integration of the financial market and 
some of the characteristics shared between the Russian banking industry and those in other emerg-
ing countries, we believe our analysis generates important implications for bank managers and regu-
lators in Russia as well as in other emerging economies. 
The structure of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 reviews the most relevant literature on 
bank diversification and on Russian banks. Section 3 provides some background on Russian bank-
ing. Section 4 describes our sample and outlines our empirical methodology.  Section 5 presents the 
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2  Literature review 
 
We separate the literature review into two sections:  (a) literature on focus versus diversification, 
and (b) literature on Russian banks. 
 
2.1   Focus versus diversification literature 
 
Conventional wisdom in the banking literature argues that banks should be as diversified as possi-
ble.  First, it is argued that banks could reduce their chances and/or expected costs of financial dis-
tress/bankruptcy  by  spreading  operations  across  different  products  and  economic  environments 
(Boot and Schmeits (2000)).  This argument is supported by several empirical studies.  Boyd and 
Graham (1988) find lowered risk of bankruptcy of banks that merge with insurance companies, 
Rose (1989) suggests reduced cash flow risk for banks when they move into non-bank product 
lines, Templeton and Severiens (1992) find that diversifying into other financial services reduces 
banks’ unsystematic risk, and Berger et al. (1999) find that consolidation in the financial services 
industry has been consistent with greater diversification of risk on average.  Second, theoretical 
studies suggest that diversification makes it cheaper for institutions to achieve credibility in their 
role  as  screeners  or  monitors  of  borrowers  (e.g.,  Diamond  (1984),  Ramakrishnan  and  Thakor 
(1984), Boyd and Prescott (1986)). In addition, some studies propose that diversifying firms can 
benefit from the leveraging of managerial skills and abilities across products, or from activity diver-
sification  that  generates  economies  of  scope  for  the  organization  (e.g.,  Iskandar-Datta  and 
McLaughlin (2005), Drucker and Puri (2009)).  
On the other hand, some studies join the general consensus in corporate literature (e.g., 
Jensen (1986), Berger and Ofek (1996), Servaes (1996), Denis et al. (1997)) and argue that the cost 
of diversification might outweigh the benefits.  Therefore, a financial institution should focus on a 
single line of business so as to take the maximum advantage of management’s expertise and reduce 
agency problems, leaving investors to diversify on their own. Consistent with this view, DeYoung 
and Roland (2001) find that US banks replacing traditional lending activities with fee-based activi-
ties are associated with higher revenue volatility, implying higher risk.
3 Similarly, Stiroh (2004) 
documents that non-interest diversification is negatively related with performance. Complementing 
                                                 
3 Demsetz and Strahan (1997) also find that large bank holding companies are better diversified than small bank holding 
companies, but that the diversification does not translate into lower risk levels because of lower capital ratios, larger 
commercial and industrial loan portfolios, and greater use of derivatives by large banks. Allen N. Berger, Iftekhar Hasan, Iikka Korhonen and  
Mingming Zhou  
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the agency-theoretic analysis of the boundaries of a bank’s activities, as proposed in Cerasi and Dal-
tung (2000), Acharya et al. (2006) suggest that there are diseconomies of scope that arise through 
weakened monitoring incentives and a poorer quality loan portfolio when a risky bank expands into 
additional industries and sectors.  Laeven and Levine (2007) find that financial conglomerates en-
gaging in multiple lending activities have lower market value than they would if they were split into 
separate financial institutions. Similarly, most of the studies on cost scope economies within the fi-
nancial service sector find no substantial evidence of such economies (e.g., Berger et al. (1987), 
Mester (1987, 1993), Hunter et al. (1990), Noulas et al. (1990), Berger and Humphrey (1991), 
Goldberg et al. (1991), Pulley and Humphrey (1993)). 
The existing banking literature on diversification is heavily concentrated in US and Euro-
pean banking markets, leaving the emerging economies largely unexamined. One exception is Ber-
ger et al. (2010), which empirically examines the diversification-performance linkage for Chinese 
banks, and finds that both product and geography diversifications are associated with reduced prof-
its and higher costs.  However, their study does not account for the nonlinearity of the relationship 
between performance and diversification, nor do they examine whether diversification-performance 
linkage relates nonmonotonically to banks’ risk and/or ownership.   
 
2.2  Literature on Russian banks 
 
While Russia is an important and rapidly growing economy, the literature on the Russian banking 
system has been fairly sparse. We are able to contribute to this still nascent literature, as until now 
the papers on Russian banking have concentrated on issues other than the effects of diversification 
strategies. 
In recent years, there have been a number of papers on Russian bank supervision and in-
troduction of the deposit  insurance scheme (e.g., Montes-Negret  and Camara (2006),  Vernikov 
(2007), Clayes and Schoors (2007)), market discipline and deposit interest rates (e.g., Peresetsky et 
al. (2007)), bank failures (e.g., Lanine and Vennet (2006), Fungacova and Weill (2009)), and bank 
efficiency (e.g., Styrin (2005), Karas et al. (2008)). In this section, we briefly review some of the 
results from these papers. 
Turning first to the efficiency studies, Karas et al. (2008) report that while foreign banks 
are more efficient than other banks in Russia, the public or state-owned banks are found to be more 
efficient than the domestic private banks and that the efficiency gap increased in the post-deposit 
insurance era. Their findings are partly consistent with Fries and Taci (2005) and Styrin (2005),  
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both of which report superior efficiency of foreign banks. These results are generally confirmed for 
other transition countries by Bonin et al. (2005a,b). 
Clayes and Schoors (2007) delve into the potential conflict between micro - and macro-
prudential objectives of bank supervisors by investigating the licensing policy of the Russian central 
bank, and report evidence supportive of both  dimensions. The  analysis strongly indicates that 
macro-prudential concerns related to systemic stability are present in the central bank’s objective 
function. Vernikov (2007) criticizes the lack of privatization of the core Russian state banks and 
draws a similarity between Russian state banks and the big Chinese state banks, as opposed to the 
liberalized and privatized Eastern and Central European banking industries. Fungacova and Solanko 
(2008) focus on the riskiness of Russian banks during 1999-2007 and report a higher likelihood of 
insolvency for the large Russian banks. Ungan et al. (2008) investigate the consolidation and re-
structuring actions of the Russian central bank in the post-2000 environment and find evidence con-
sistent with market discipline, where higher capitalized and more liquid banking institutions are 
more successful in attracting and increasing their deposit base. Peresetsky et al. (2007) and Pereset-
sky (2008) analyze market discipline and market behavior in the post-deposit insurance regime, and 
show that market discipline weakened after deposit insurance was introduced. Finally, Lanine and 
Vennet (2006) and Fungacova and Weill (2009) investigate failure predictions for Russian banks, 
pointing to shortfalls in liquidity, asset quality, and capital adequacy, as well as market competitive-
ness, as the major factors.   
 
 
3  Background information on Russian banks 
 
In this section, we provide background information on the Russian banking industry, along with a 
discussion of Russian banks’ focus strategies, and the entry of foreign banks. 
 
3.1  Historical perspective 
 
During the Soviet period, banking – like other economic activities – was tightly controlled by the 
state. When cautious economic reforms were launched in the mid-1980s, the banking sector was 
also affected. In 1987, the USSR began a two-tiered banking sector, with the central bank, Gosbank, 
in charge of the overall money supply and engaging in certain commercial banking activities, and 
several specialized spetsbanki banks handling savings (Sberbank), agriculture (Agroprombank), in-Allen N. Berger, Iftekhar Hasan, Iikka Korhonen and  
Mingming Zhou  
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dustry (Promstroibank), housing (Zhilsotsbank), investment credit (Stoybank), and foreign trade 
(Vneshtorgbank).  When the Soviet Union broke up and economic reforms commenced in Russia in 
1991-1992, several hundred new banks – owned by individuals, governments, corporations, and 
other organizations – began to enter the market (Claeys and Schoors, 2007). At the end of 1991, 
Russia had about 1,700 banking institutions (Rautava, 1996), and by the end of 1995, there were 
over 3,300 banks (Ungan et al., (2008)). At the same time, a number of foreign banks and their sub-
sidiaries joined the market. However, during the aftermath of the 1995 interbank money market cri-
sis, a large number of banks either failed or had their banking licenses revoked. During the severe 
financial crisis of 1998, the ruble was devalued, the Russian government suspended its debt servic-
ing, and several banks suspended operations. In the post-crisis environment, however, banks began 
to reorganize their businesses. New prudential regulatory rules in 2002 spurred further restructuring, 
as did the adoption of international accounting standards and guidelines based on Basel Accord 
principles. In 2004, a new deposit insurance system was introduced and initially implemented in the 
largest banks.  However, by 2006, most deposits in the banking market were covered by the deposit 
insurance scheme.     
After the 1998 crisis, the role of Russian banks as financial intermediaries was strength-
ened and the economy underwent a process of financial deepening. The Russian economy has been 
much more stable, and rapid growth has increased the demand for bank lending and deposits. For 
example, the ratio of domestic credit in the private sector to GDP was only 13.3% in 1998, but by 
2007 it had risen to 38.5%. During this period, the number of foreign banking institutions in Russia 
also increased, with about 50 foreign credit institutions active in the market and holding over 11% 
of the total market assets (Central Bank of Russia (2008)). Nevertheless, the banking sector contin-
ues to be dominated by the large state-controlled banks.  
Table 1 provides further details on entries and exits of banks during the sample years. At 
the end of 2006, there were 1,344 credit institutions of which 1,292 were banks. Some 88% of these 
banks had a license granted by the central bank to operate and 71% could take deposits from savers. 
Over 60% of licensed banks were allowed to conduct operations in foreign exchange-related trans-
actions. Although there was substantial foreign involvement in the local banking industry, only 52 
banks were wholly foreign-owned and 31 were state-run. There were also substantial exits of banks 
(license revoked) during the sample years. Given that our sample covers the vast majority of Rus-
sian banks, we can further illustrate the structure of Russian banks based on Table 2.  Panel A of 
Table 2 shows the distributions of Russian banks across different locations, size, and foreign owner- 
BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/ 2010 
 
 
  11 
ship. Of the 1,010 Russian banks in our sample for year 2006, 393 are Moscow-based (headquarters 
in Moscow), 28 are St. Petersburg-based, and the rest are located in other cities/regions. The n a-
tional banks – generally the largest – have headquarters in Moscow. In terms of size, Panel A of 
Table 2 shows that of the 1,010 sample banks in 2006, 27 have total assets exceeding 100 billion 
rubles (3.8 billion US dollars), 113 banks have total assets between 10 billion and 100 billion ru-
bles, etc. In Panel B of Table 2, we find that the largest banks with assets exceeding 100 billion ru-
bles account for 63.67% of total banking assets in our sample.   
 
3.2  Entry of foreign banks 
 
After 2004, Russian banks began to face more competition from foreign banks, as higher economic 
growth and a more stable macroeconomic environment attracted a large number of foreign banks 
into the market, although most of them concentrated in the corporate lending sector rather than 
competing in consumer loans with the domestic Russian banks. Table 1 shows the numbers of 
banks with at least minimal foreign stakes (more than 1%), the wholly foreign-owned banks, and 
the majority foreign-owned banks (foreign ownership exceeding 50%), along with other categories 
of banks in Russia. Between 1999 and 2006, the number of banks with at least minimal foreign 
stakes increased from 130 to 153, while the number of wholly foreign-owned banks more than dou-
bled. In Table 2, both Panel A and Panel B provide the distributions of banks associated with differ-
ent levels of foreign ownership. While Panel A clearly shows that the majority of Russian banks 
(92.28% in numbers) are not associated with foreign ownership, Panel B suggests that the percent-
age of total assets in banks with no foreign ownership accounts for only about 59.31% of total as-
sets in all banks in our sample. Of the banks associated with foreign ownership, those with foreign 
ownership between 0% and 25% account for the largest share of assets (28.52%), followed by 
banks with foreign ownership between 75% and 100% (8.24%).  The heterogeneity of foreign own-
ership of Russian banks enables us to conduct a more in-depth investigation of the role of foreign 
ownership in the diversification-performance linkage. 
 
3.3  Diversification in the operations of Russian banks 
 
Some studies report that in recent years Russian banks have increased their lending to small and 
medium-sized enterprises and have extended their operations to consumer loans (including housing 
loans). As a result, some less diversified local banks could become more vulnerable to a decline in Allen N. Berger, Iftekhar Hasan, Iikka Korhonen and  
Mingming Zhou  
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housing prices (e.g., Fungacova and Solanko (2008)). On the other hand, most foreign banks, hav-
ing fewer local connections, are expected to have a somewhat different focus of operations than the 
domestic banks. 
Panel B of Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of disaggregated components in asset, 
loan, liability, and deposit portfolios for the banks in our sample. In terms of asset structure, the av-
erage bank has 2.59% of total assets is in government securities, 73.93% in loans, 6.28% in promis-
sory notes, 2.88% in foreign assets, and 14.31% in other assets. In the loan portfolios, the average 
bank has 36.41% of its loans to other banks, 53.17% in loans to firms and entrepreneurs, with less 
than 11% of in loans to government, individuals, or foreigners. In the liability portfolio, 85.29% of 
total liabilities are in deposits, 10.26% in non-bond debt securities, and 4.44% in bonds, foreign or 
other liabilities. Finally, the deposit portfolio of the average bank is dominated by deposits of firms 
(62.13%) and individuals (23.33%). 
 
 
4  Sample and methodology 
 
In this section, we describe the data source and sample. We also present a brief outline of the meth-
odology for measuring Russian banks’ economies of diversification, focus indices, and other vari-
ables.   
 
4.1  Sample 
 
Our sample is a large unbalanced annual panel dataset which includes almost all Russian commer-
cial banks of the post-1998 crisis period, from 1999 to 2006. The annual observations in our sample 
are based on quarterly bank-level data from the Financial Information Agency Interfax. To ensure 
that a bank in the sample engages in lending activities, we discard banks with loans below 5% of 
total assets. We also exclude from the sample banks with negative capital ratios. The cleaned sam-
ple includes 1449 banks from 1999 - 2006, i.e. 9997 bank-year observations. 
As mentioned above, the majority of the market share of the Russian banking sector is ac-
counted for by the large Moscow-based and state-controlled banks. However, the Russian banking 
sector is also extremely fragmented by a large number of very small banks. In addition, compared 
with banking sectors in Central European transitional economies, the Russian state has maintained a  
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relatively high degree of control over the banking sector, and the presence of foreign ban ks has 
been more limited.  
For each bank in our sample, data are available to calculate the following portfolio decom-
positions: 
1.  A disaggregated loan decomposition based on each bank’s correspondent accounts with oth-
er banks (L1), loans to federal, regional, and local governments (L2), loans to firms and indi-
vidual entrepreneurs (L3), loans to households (L4), and loans to foreign nonbanks (L5). 
2.  A disaggregated deposit decomposition based on each bank’s deposits in correspondent ac-
counts (D1), deposits in interbank accounts (D2), deposits by federal, regional, and local 
government (D3), deposits by firms (D4), and deposits by households and individuals (D5). 
3.  A disaggregated asset decomposition based on each bank’s assets in government securities 
investments (A1), assets in total loans (A2), assets in promissory notes investments (A3), as-
sets in foreign assets (A4), and assets in other assets (A5). 
4.  A disaggregated geographical decomposition based on each bank’s liabilities in deposits 
(B1), liabilities in non-bond debt securities issued (B2), liabilities in bonds issued (B3), for-
eign liabilities (B4), and other liabilities (B5). 
 
4.2  Economies of diversification approach 
 
We apply the economies of diversification approach of Berger et al. (2010) to the Russian banks. In 
the following, we briefly describe the estimation issues, including functional form and variable se-
lection.  For a more detailed description of the economies of diversification framework, see Berger 
et al. (2010).   
The concept of economies of diversification is based on prior banking studies that use the 
concept of economies of scope (e.g.,  Berger et al. (1993, 1996), Clark and Siems (1997)). Profit 
scope economies are the proportional increases in profit from producing a given output jointly ver-
sus via specialist firms.  Usually, a single continuous profit function is used for joint producers but 
assumed to apply to specialists as well because of an absence of data on specialists.  For the selec-
tion of the profit function, we follow Berger et al. (2010) and adopt a modified version of the com-
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where π is profit, Li is the i
th loan output, i = 1, 2, …, n (n = 5 in our case).  z is the fixed netput (to-
tal assets), wk is the k
th input price, k = 1, 2, .., m (m = 3 in our case).  For input prices, we have: w1 
(price of labor, proxied by the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets), w2 (price of other funds, 
proxied by the ratio of interest expenses on other funds to total other funds), w3 (price of deposits, 
proxied by the ratio of interest expenses on deposits to total deposits).
4  Dt is the t
th year dummy, 
where t = 1, 2, …, T-1 (T = 8 in our case).
5   
In equation (1), we normalize the dependent variable by the quantity of the fixed netput (z) 
and the price of last input (w3). We also normalize all the output terms by z, and we normalize the 
first two input prices by w3.  As mentioned earlier, z is total assets, and w3 is the price of deposits.
6  
In the following, let π(L1, L2, L3, L4, L5, w, z, year) be the predicted profit function with all variables 
at their means.  Nonlinear least squares regressions are used to estimate the coefficients in the com-
posite profit function based on the observed sample of joint producers, and by assuming that the 
focused banks have the same profit function as the diversified banks, we are able to obtain predicted 
profits for both observed diversified banks and hypothetical focused banks.   
In our context of product diversification for Russian banks, the profit economies of the di-
versification approach  yields five measures, each being the proportional difference in predicted 
profits between the observed diversified bank and a hypothetical focused bank that uses all its re-
sources to produce just one product. If the focused bank produces only the second product, for ex-
ample, the measure is 
) 5 , 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 (
T D  [π(L1, L2, L3, L4, L5, w, z, year) – π(0, L1 + L2 + L3+ L4 + L5, 0, 0, 0, w, z, 
year)] / π(L1, L2, L3, L4, L5, w, z, year).                                                                            … (2) 
We calculate the quasi-diversification economies to avoid the inaccurate measurement is-
sue when considerable extrapolation beyond the sample data is required given that no firms are ob-
served at zero outputs, as discussed by Berger et al. (2000b). Assuming that firms produce at least 
                                                 
4 Because data on total numbers of employees are not available at bank level, we use the ratio of personnel expenses to 
total assets as the price of labor. 
5 Note that we estimate the alternative profit function, which specifies output quantities,  instead of the standard profit 
function, which specifies output prices. 
6 The normalization by total assets, z, is designed to control for heteroskedasticity, reduce scale biases in estimation, and 
make the model more suitable for economic interpretation. The normalization by w3 imposes linear homogeneity in the 
input prices (see Berger et al. (2000b) for more discussion).  
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the minimum observed value of each of the outputs, we measure the quasi -diversification econo-
mies of profit.  For the second product, for example, the measure is 
T QD (1,2,3,4,5) = {π(L1, L2, L3, L4, L5, w, z, year) – π[L1min, (L1 + L2 + L3 + L4 + L5) – 
                                (L1min + L3min + L4min + L5min), L3min,  L4min, L5min, w, z, year]}  
                                / π(L1, L2, L3, L4, L5, w, z, year).                                                      … (3) 
We  also  estimate  a  cost  function  using  the  same  specification  and  give  the  quasi-
diversification economies for cost measures as below, by comparing costs as between a hypothetical 
focused bank (which specializes in the second product) and the diversified bank: 
T QD (1,2,3,4,5) for cost = { C[L1min, (L1 + L2 + L3 + L4 + L5) – (L1min + L3min + L4min + L5min),  
                                            L3min, L4min, L5min, w, z, year] – C(L1, L2, L3, L4, L5, w, z, year) }  
                                            / C(L1, L2, L3, L4, L5, w, z, year).                                         … (4) 
The profit (cost) economies of diversification for alternative focus strategies (i.e., focusing 
on alternative products) are calculated in a similar manner. Positive profit (cost) economies of di-
versification suggest a diversification premium or economies of diversification (i.e., the diversified 
bank enjoys higher profits (lower costs) than the hypothetical focused bank, and a negative number 
suggests a diversification discount, or diseconomies of diversification (i.e., the diversified bank per-
forms  worse  than  the  hypothetical  focused  bank).  Then  we  calculate  the  weighted  average  of 
economies of diversification measures for asset, loan, liability, and deposit portfolios based on the 
profit premiums or cost discounts on individual components of the portfolios, with weights being 
the proportions of the components of the portfolio. 
   
4.3  Focus index 
 
We also construct a more conventional measure of focus versus diversification, the Focus Index.  
Following Acharya et al. (2006),  the Focus Index is the sum of squares of the proportions of port-
folios in each classification. In our case, we construct four different Focus Indices: loan, deposit, 
asset, and geographic. 
For the loan Focus Index, we denote the loans in each of the five loan categories as Li, 
where i =1, 2, …, 5, so that 
Loan Focus Index =
5
1
2 ) / (
i i Q L , where 
5
1 j j L Q                                                    …(5) 
Note that the Focus Index, by definition, ranges from 1/n, or 1/5 in this case, to 1, with a 
higher value of the index indicating more focus (less diversification). Allen N. Berger, Iftekhar Hasan, Iikka Korhonen and  
Mingming Zhou  
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4.4  Other variables 
 
For risk proxies, we follow some recent studies that investigate bank risk-taking behavior in emerg-
ing markets (e.g., Haselmann and Wachtel (2007), Maechler et al. (2007)) and use three alternative 
proxies for bank risk: volatility, defined as the standard deviation of quarterly earnings (earnings 
here refer to the ratio of pre-tax profit to total assets); nonperforming loan ratio (NPL); and loan 
loss provision ratio (LLP). The market measure of risks is not available due to the limited number 
of banks listed on the stock exchange. All of the tables shown in the paper use volatility of quarterly 
earnings as the proxy for risk, while we also run robustness checks by using NPL and LLP alterna-
tively as risk proxies (these robustness results are available from the authors upon request). In all 
the regressions, we include a continuous variable, foreign ownership (foreign), to capture the effect 
of foreign involvement on bank performance and the interaction effects between foreign ownership 
and the focus index for bank performance. We obtained the foreign ownership data from the Central 
Bank of Russia. We further control for bank location to see if Moscow-based and St. Petersburg 
banks, having wider networks of branches across the nation and sometimes overseas and thus better 
access to domestic and international interbank markets, are able to gain larger economies of diversi-
fication when they diversify their product ranges. We also control for the capital ratio, amount of 
bank assets, and changes in the environment that are common to all banks (including global or 
country-level  economic  developments,  important  changes  in  the  institutional  set-up  of  Russian 
banks, such as the introduction of deposit insurance scheme) by adding year dummies to the regres-
sions.  
Table 3 (Panel A) presents summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis, where 
all financial items (except ratios) are in thousands of rubles, inflation-adjusted to the price level of 
year 1996.  Note that there is a wide range of pre-tax ROAs for the banks in our sample, and we do 
not exclude those with very poor performance because our intention is to examine the diversifica-
tion-performance connection for all the banks, not just for the better performers. The range of vola-
tility of quarterly earnings, from 0 to 11.41, seems to suggest that some Russian banks have very 
volatile earnings from one quarter to another, even after the 1998 crisis (given that our sample runs 
from 1999 to 2006).  Such volatility of quarterly earnings might reflect changes in nonperforming 
loan ratios or net provisions ratios during the sample period, which also exhibit wide ranges based 
on descriptive statistics reported in Table 3. 
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics on profit premiums (Panel A) and cost discounts 
(Panel B) measured by economies of diversification for the asset, loan, liability, and deposit portfo- 
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lios of Russian banks. While the range of profit premiums and cost discounts is sometimes wide 
(e.g., the profit premium for asset diversification ranges from -0.62 to 0.59), the means of all the 
profit premiums are negative, and the means of all the cost discounts are positive, regardless of the 
reference of alternative portfolios. In other words, on average, a diversified in our sample is associ-
ated with lower profits and lower costs compared to a (quasi) focused bank. In the next section, we 
present more results and discussion based on regression analysis. 
 
5  Empirical results 
 
5.1  Tests of the effects of risk and foreign ownership on economies of diversifi-
cation 
 
In order to investigate the effects of foreign ownership and risk on the economies of diversification, 
we specify the following regression equations: 
2
1 , 4 1 , 3
2
, 2 , 1 , ) ( t i t i t i t i t i foreign foreign risk risk CD PP  
                  t i t i t i z foreign risk , 1 , , 5          …(6) 
For Equation (6), we run regressions for profit premium (PP, the profit economies of di-
versification measure) or cost discount (CD, the cost economies of diversification measure) against 
a group of variables of interest, including risk, risk squared, foreign (with one-year lag), foreign 
squared, and the interaction term between risk and foreign, while z is a vector of control variables 
including location (Moscow and St. Petersburg, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is lo-
cated in Moscow or St. Petersburg, 0 otherwise), capital ratio (total equity/total assets), and log of 
bank size (ln(assets)). We include the squared terms for both foreign ownership and risk, because it 
is possible that the effect of ownership and risk on economies of scope is nonlinear, as indicated by 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Delios and Wu (2005).  Throughout this paper, regressions are run 
by pooling all bank-year observations with year dummies.   
The regression results are shown in Tables 5 and 6.  Table 5 presents the OLS regressions 
for profit premium on firm characteristics of Russian banks. The profit premium is calculated on 
four different definitions of decompositions of portfolios, and for each definition of a portfolio, we 
display three regressions. The first regression only includes linear terms of firm characteristic vari-
ables, while the second includes the interaction terms between risk and foreign in addition to the 
linear terms. The third regression further includes the squared terms for risk and foreign ownership, Allen N. Berger, Iftekhar Hasan, Iikka Korhonen and  
Mingming Zhou  
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as described by equation (9). All independent variables are based on concurrent terms except for-
eign which is based on the one-year lagged terms.
7   
There are several interesting results shown in Table 5. First, note that when only linear 
terms of risk (volatility) and foreign ownership are included in the first regression in each group, the 
results indicate that risk is significantly and positively correlated with profit premium and that fo r-
eign ownership is significantly and positively correlated with profit premium.  In oth er words, 
banks tend to gain more profit economies of diversification with increased risk, and/or with i n-
creased foreign ownership. For the second regression in each group, which includes the interaction 
term of risk and foreign ownership, we find that the  coefficient of the interaction term is negative 
significant, suggesting that foreign ownership tends to weaken the marginal effects of risk on profit 
economies of diversification. In the third regression in each group, the squared terms of risk are a s-
sociated with negative significant coefficients, while the squared terms of foreign ownership are 
associated with positive significant coefficients. To get a clearer look at the individual effects of 
risk and foreign ownership on profit economies of scope, we provide the plots in Figures 1-A and 1-
B. 
Figure 1-A plots the profit economies of diversification measure (profit premium) against 
the measure of risk (volatility), based on statistical results from the third regression in each group in 
Table 5. Because we focus on the relationship between risk and profit premium here, we replace the 
values of other variables in the equation with their mean values. Here we find that the shapes of the 
curves tend to be dominated by a positive relationship between risk and p rofit premium (though 
some concavity is still noticeable), and this observation holds across the four different portfolio d i-
versification measures.  On average, banks tend to gain more profit economies of diversification 
when their operations are associated with higher risk. 
Figure 1-B depicts the relationship between foreign ownership and profit premium, based 
on statistical results from the third regression in each group in Table 5. From the shape of the four 
curves corresponding to each of the four portfolio diversification, we find patterns of strong nonlin-
earity for the effect of foreign ownership on profit premium. Specifically, except for the liability 
diversification curve which shows a monotonically (but nonlinear) positive relationship between 
foreign ownership and profit premium, the other three curves clearly exhibit convexity: the profit 
premium tends to decrease when foreign ownership increases from zero to a small positive number, 
                                                 
7 The underlying assumption for using one-year lag of foreign is that it might take some time for foreign ownership to 
impact firm performance, while the relationship between performance and such terms as risk and capital ratio are 
mostly concurrent.  
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but at some point when foreign ownership increases to a higher p ercentage, the profit premium 
tends to increase (so the banks enjoy more profit economies of diversification). It is possible that 
when foreign owners enter a bank as minority shareholders, that bank may lose its privileged posi-
tion within a business group or vis-à-vis authorities, which would then lead to lower profits in the 
short run. But when a foreign owner acquires a majority stake in a bank, the new owner can exert 
much greater influence on the operations of the bank from the very start. New owners are likely to 
bring in better know-how and may be of help in improving corporate governance, leading to a 
higher profit premium. 
In Table 6, the same sets of regressions as for Table 5 are run for the cost discount.  From 
the first regression in each group of portfolio diversification, which only includes the linear terms of 
firm characteristics, we find that both risk and foreign ownership are significantly and positively 
correlated with the cost discount; in other words, the banks tend to achieve more cost economies of 
diversification when they are associated with higher risk and more foreign ownership when a linear 
relationship is imposed. In the second regression in each group, the positive significant coefficient 
associated with this interaction term across all portfolio diversifications seems to suggest that for-
eign ownership tends to strengthen the marginal effects of risk on cost economies of diversification. 
For the third regression in each group, we find that the squared risk terms are associated with nega-
tive significant  coefficients, while the squared foreign ownership terms are associated with positive 
significant coefficients. Again, in order to gain a better understanding of the individual effects of 
the risk and foreign ownership, we provide Figures 2-A and 2-B based on Table 6 results. 
Figure 2-A depicts the relationship between risk and the cost discount. For the cost econo-
mies measure based on asset diversification, we find that risk tends to exert a strong positive impact 
on cost discount; in other words, with increased risk, the differences in costs between the focused 
banks and the diversified banks tend to increase (holding other factors at mean value). However, for 
the other three portfolios (loan, liability, deposit), the curves are nearly flat and horizontal, which 
tends to suggest a very marginal effect of risk on the cost discount when banks diversify in these 
portfolios. In Figure 2-B, the pattern of the relationship between foreign ownership and the cost dis-
count is also interesting. We find that foreign ownership has hardly any effect on the cost discount 
as regards loan portfolio diversification, and foreign ownership is positively correlated with the cost 
discount when banks diversify their deposit and liability portfolios. Finally, when banks diversify 
their asset portfolios, foreign ownership tends to have a nonlinear (convex) relationship with the 
cost discount. Allen N. Berger, Iftekhar Hasan, Iikka Korhonen and  
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5.2  Tests of effects of risk, focus indices, and foreign ownership on bank  
performance 
 
We turn now to the conventional (inverse) measure of diversification, the Focus Index. The Focus 
Index is described in Section 4.3, and summary statistics are presented in Table 7. The magnitudes 
of standard deviations relative to means seem to suggest that the Russian banks are generally char-
acterized by large variations in their diversification strategies for asset, deposit, liability, and deposit 
portfolios. 
Given that any clear interpretation of the effect of diversification on bank performance 
must be based on the risk-return tradeoff, the complete analysis will ideally examine the overall role 
of a bank’s diversification strategy on its return and risk in an integrated framework. Conceptually 
speaking, if diversification serves to increase (decrease) bank returns and decrease (increase) bank 
risk, we interpret this as implying that diversification improves (weakens) bank performance. When 
bank return and bank risk either both increase or both decrease with the degree of diversification, 
the overall effects on bank performance are ambiguous and cannot be determined without taking a 
stand on what constitutes an efficient risk-return trade-off.  Let us start the analysis with a highly 
simplified linear regression model: 
t i t i t i t i t i t i z foreign FI risk return , , 1 , 3 1 , 2 , 1 ,                     … (7) 
In Equation (7), we test whether focus (measured by Focus Indices, or FI) is harmful to 
bank returns (β2 < 0) while controlling for risk, foreign ownership, and other factors. We measure 
bank return by the ratio of pre-tax profit to total assets, which is the closest measure to ROA that we 
can get from the financial data on Russian banks. We complement this measure with the ratio of 
total expenses to total assets, as an alternative measure of bank performance. We use the one-year 
lagged term of Focus Indices to partially address the issue of endogeneity of focus measures, and 
later we complement this analysis with an important robustness check that treats the focus measures 
as endogenously determined. We adjust returns for risk by also employing the risk measure (stan-
dard deviation of quarterly pretax profits/total assets) as an explanatory variable.
8  Consistent with 
the estimations in Table 5 and 6, we use one-year lagged term of foreign, to allow an elapse of time 
before the effects of the changes in this variable begin to show up in performance. As mentioned 
earlier, the year dummies help us to control for the possible effects of changes in macroeconomic 
                                                 
8 We also test for the robustness of our results over the alternative risk measures, including the ratio of nonperforming 
loans to total assets and the ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets (tables available on request).  
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conditions, among other things. The vector z represents an array of control variables, which are the 
same as in Tables 5 and 6, including location, capital ratio, and log of bank size.   
The results are presented in the first regression in each group of portfolio definitions (see 
columns 1, 4, 7, and 10 in Table 8). They show that risk, Focus Index, and foreign ownership are 
significantly and positively correlated with pre-tax ROA when the other factors are taken into ac-
count. In particular, the positive signs of coefficients of Focus Index across the four different meas-
ures of diversification suggest that banks on average enjoy higher pre-tax ROA when they focus. 
Again, we note that these observations are based on the assumption of a linear relationship between 
firm characteristics and performance.   
After the simple test of a linear relationship between bank performance and the Focus in-
dex, as specified in equation (7), we test whether the diversification-performance relationship de-
pends linearly on the level of bank risk and foreign ownership, based on the following equations: 
 
2
1 , 6 1 , 5
2
1 , 4 1 , 3
2
, 2 , 1 , t i t i t i t i t i t i t i foreign foreign FI FI risk risk return
     t i t i t i t i t i t i z foreign FI risk FI , , 1 , 1 , 8 , 1 , 7   …(8) 
  Thus   1 , 8 , 7 1 , 4 3 2
) (
) (
t i t i t i foreign risk FI
FI
return     …(9) 
In Equation (8), bank return is modeled as being dependent not only on the linear terms in 
the Focus Indices, risk and foreign ownership but also on their squared terms, because of the possi-
bility (mentioned above) of nonlinear effects of these factors on bank performance. Meanwhile, the 
interaction terms between Focus Indices and risk and foreign ownership are included in Equation 
(8) because we intend to test whether the effects of focus on performance depend linearly on bank 
risk and foreign ownership, as specified by equation (9), which gives the first derivative of return 
with respect to the Focus Index.  
The results of these regressions are presented in columns 2, 5, 8, and 11 of Table 8. We 
find that the marginal effects of focus on pre-tax ROA are negatively related to the extent of focus 
and positively related to the level of risk and foreign ownership, and the associated coefficients are 
statistically significant. In other words, with a decrease in the degree of focus measures and/or in-
crease in the level of risk and/or foreign ownership, each additional unit of increase of a focus 
measure is associated with a higher (positive) increase in pre-tax ROA.   
The above findings are based on results of estimations when we impose the linear form of 
risk and other factors on the marginal effect of focus strategy on performance. However, some stud-Allen N. Berger, Iftekhar Hasan, Iikka Korhonen and  
Mingming Zhou  
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ies (e.g., Winton 1999) point out that the diversification-performance relationship may in fact de-
pend on bank risk in a nonlinear way. Acharya et al. (2006) also argue that the conflict of interest 
between bank owners and bank creditors might also impose a U-shape relationship between diversi-
fication -performance and bank risk, because an increase in the probability of insolvency reduces 
bank owners’ incentive to monitor loans. At the same time, the effect of diversification on perform-
ance may also depend on ownership in a nonlinear way. Banks might enjoy different benefits asso-
ciated with changes in foreign ownership in a minority foreign-owned bank versus a majority for-
eign-owned bank. Therefore, to try to capture the implied U-shaped (nonmonotonic) nature of the 
diversification-performance relationship as a function of bank risk and foreign ownership, we mod-




, 4 , 3 1 , 2 1 , 1 , 1 ( t i t i t i t i t i t i foreign risk risk FI FI return  
) 1 ( ) , 9 , 8 , 1 , 7
2
1 , 6 t i t i t i t i t i risk risk risk foreign foreign          
t i t i t i t i z foreign foreign , , 1 , 11 1 , 10 ) 1 (                                       …(10) 
and so   1 , 5 1
2
, 4 1 , 3 1 1 , 2 1 1 2
) (
) (




1 , , 7 1
2
1 , 6 1 t i t i t i foreign risk foreign                        (11) 
In Equation (10), we further include the two-way interaction terms between Focus Indices 
(FI) and risk-squared, FI and foreign-squared, as well as the three-way interaction term among FI, 
risk, and foreign ownership in addition to all the independent factors in Equation (8). This specifica-
tion  allows  us  to  examine  whether  the  effects  of  diversification  on  bank  performance  depend 
nonlinearly on the level of risk and foreign ownership, as shown by Equation (11), which gives the 
first derivatives of return with respect to Focus Index. If, for example, the effect of a bank’s focus 
on its returns is U-shaped in risk, then β1β4 should be statistically significant. Similarly, if the mar-
ginal effect of a bank’s focus strategy on its return is U-shaped, then β1β6 should be statistically sig-
nificant.  
The results of these regressions are presented in columns 3, 6, 9, and 12 of Table 8. We 
find that the coefficient(s) associated with the interaction terms between Focus Index and squared 
terms of risk  are negative significant, which points to a concave relationship between the marginal 
effects of focus on pre-tax ROA and risk . Similarly, the negative significant coefficient of the in-
teraction terms of Focus Index and squared terms of foreign ownership indicate concavity of the  
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impact of foreign ownership on the marginal effects of focus on performance (pre -tax ROA). To 
illustrate these results, we present Figures 3-A, and 3-B. 
Figure 3-A plots the marginal effects of Focus Indices on pre-tax ROA against risk based 
on the coefficients reported by the third regression in each group of portfolio diversification in Ta-
ble 8, and setting the value of each of the other variables at their means. The upward sloping curves 
in this graph show that the marginal effects of Focus Indices on pre-tax ROA tend to increase with 
higher risk. In other words, banks benefit more from being focused in terms of pre-tax profits when 
they operate at a higher risk level, holding other factors constant. Figure 3-B plots the marginal ef-
fects of Focus Indices on pre-tax ROA against foreign ownership, and the underlying data are also 
based on the statistics reported on the third regression in each group of portfolio diversification.  
Here a different pattern is detected for the role of foreign ownership: except for the liability Focus 
Index curve, which shows a monotonically upward sloping trend, the other three curves are clearly 
characterized by nonlinearity, i.e., concavity. In other words, at a lower level of foreign ownership, 
the banks benefit from being focused, as pre-tax profits tend to be greater with the increase in for-
eign ownership. However, this positive role of foreign ownership, after a certain point, turns nega-
tive. Based on the graph and the underlying data, the level of foreign ownership associated with the 
largest marginal effects of Focus Index on performance ranges from 0.43 to 0.52. 
Table 9 presents the OLS regressions of cost ratio (total expenses-to-total assets) on risk, 
Focus Indices, foreign ownership, and other firm characteristics. Specifications of the regressions 
and definitions of the variables are as in Table 8. In the first regression in each group of portfolio 
diversification (columns 1, 4, 7, and 10), we find that the cost ratio is positively and significantly 
correlated with risk, negatively significantly correlated with Focus Indices, and positively signif i-
cantly correlated with foreign ownership, when the linear assumption is imposed. The second and 
third regressions in each group, however, tend to suggest a nonlinear relationship between the cost 
ratio and these variables.  In particular, in the second regression in each group (columns 2, 5, 8, and 
11) we find that all the squared terms of the three key variables (i.e., risk, Focus Index, and foreign 
ownership) are associated with negative significant coefficients, which indicates concavity. In the 
third regression in each group (columns 3, 6, 9, and 12), we find that both the interaction between 
Focus Index (lagged) and squared volatility and the interaction between Focus Index and squared 
foreign ownership are associated with positive significant coefficients, which indicates that the rela-
tionship between risk/foreign ownership and the marginal effects of Focus Index on cost ratio is 
convex. To illustrate these results, we present Figures 4-A and 4-B. Allen N. Berger, Iftekhar Hasan, Iikka Korhonen and  
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  Figure 4-A plots the marginal effects of Focus Indices on cost ratio against risk, based 
on results of on the third regression in each group of portfolio diversification in Table 9. We find 
that for asset and liability portfolio diversification, an increase in risk tends to monotonically reduce 
the marginal effects of Focus Indices on cost whereas, for the loan and deposit portfolio diversifica-
tion, the relationship between risk and marginal effects of Focus Indices on cost is convex. In other 
words, banks on average tend to enjoy greater cost savings by being focused on asset and liability at 
lower risk level, while for loan and deposit diversification, the relationship between the impact of 
focus on costs and risk is less straightforward. Figure 4-B plots the marginal effects of Focus Indi-
ces on cost ratio against foreign ownership. This graph shows that, except for the curve representing 
loan portfolio diversification, which exhibits strong upward slope along the increase of foreign 
ownership, the other three curves display only modest convexity, indicating that banks on average 
benefit more in cost savings by being focused when the level of foreign ownership is approximately 
between 0.35 and 0.62. 
 
5.3  Simultaneous equations of bank performance and focus 
 
To this point, we have employed focus measures with one-year lag to partially address the endogeneity 
issue. Arguably, this is appropriate for the accounting returns that we use, since any monitoring-related 
effects of focus may get captured in book returns only with a lag. However, given that it is possible that 
the concurrent practice of diversification strategy is endogenous with respect to bank performance (e.g., 
Acharya et al. (2006)), and to the extent that there might be some correlation between current diversifi-
cation strategy and past strategy (because the evolvement of strategy is path-dependent or takes time to 
change the structures of portfolios), we may obtain more efficient and/or less biased estimates if we ad-
dress the endogeneity of the Focus Indices more explicitly.   
We estimate a simultaneous equations system in which both bank return and the Focus In-
dices are treated as variables to be explained, while the error terms of the two equations in the sys-
tem are allowed to be correlated with each other.  This is essentially a seemingly unrelated regres-




, 4 , 3 1 , 2 1 , 1 , 1 ( t i t i t i t i t i t i foreign risk risk FI FI return
 
) 1 ( ) , 9 , 8 , 1 , 7
2
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t i t i t i t i t i t i t i z foreign foreign risk risk FI , ,
2
1 , 4 1 , 3
2
1 , 2 1 , 1 ,            …(13) 
For the endogenous determination of Focus Indices, we treat ln(assets) and risk (and risk-
squared) as the independent explanatory variables as instruments. The large body of banking litera-
ture which shows the positive relationship between diversification and size gives us the ex ante ra-
tionale for the use of bank size (ln(assets)) as one of the instruments for focus measures.
9  At the 
same time, purely from the standpoint of Markowitz portfolio theory, banks with relatively higher 
risk may have more incentive to diversify their portfolios. 
Table 10 (both Panels A and B) presents the estimation results for the simultaneous equa-
tion framework described above, with pre-tax ROA as the dependent variable for the first equation, 
and the focus index as the dependent variable in the second equation. To obtain a full compari son 
with the results obtained earlier via OLS regressions, we employ the same set of the variables as in 
Table 8 and enter them in the same way here as the first equation (the pre -tax ROA regressions) 
within each group of simultaneous equations. In general , we find that the results mirror what we 
find in Table 8, indicating that our results in Table 8 are robust if we explicitly control for potential 
endogeneity of the diversification decisions of Russian banks. 
Table 11 presents the results of the estimati ons of the simultaneous equations where the 
first equation uses the cost ratio (total expenses-to-total assets ratio) as the dependent variable, and 
the second equation uses the Focus Index as the dependent variable. When comparing the results in 
this table with Table 9, we find that, in general, our results in Table 9 are robust after controlling for 
endogeneity of diversification decisions.  
 
5.4  Tests of effects of diversification on bank risk 
 
To more explicitly study the effects of diversification on bank monitoring effectiveness and, in turn, 
on the quality of bank loan portfolios as banks expand the scope of their portfolios, we consider the 
risk of bank loans as the dependent variable in the regressions. The regression model is specified as 
follows, and the results are presented in Table 12. 
) 1 (
2
1 , 4 1 , 3 1 , 2 1 , 1 , t i t i t i t i t i foreign foreign FI FI risk
 
t i t i t i t i z foreign foreign , , 1 , 6 1 , 5 ) 1 (
                  …(14) 
                                                 
9 The standard arguments of this literature are based either on the finiteness of good projects or on diminishing returns 
to scale within an industry, and on the risk avoidance induced by relatively high franchise values of large banks. Allen N. Berger, Iftekhar Hasan, Iikka Korhonen and  
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In Table 12, we find that when we impose a linear relationship (in the first regressions 
within each group), the Focus Indices are negatively significantly related to risk, and foreign owner-
ship is positively significantly related to risk, while controlling for the location, capital ratio, previ-
ous pre-tax ROA, and bank size.  However, when the regressions include quadratic terms and inter-
action terms (in the second and third regressions in each group), the effects of focus indices on risk 
exhibit nonlinearity, while the nonlinearity of the effect of foreign ownership on risk is not as clear 
(as the quadratic terms of foreign ownership do not usually have significant coefficients). To illus-
trate these results, we provide Figures 5-A, and 5-B based on Table 12. 
Figure 5-A plots risk against the four Focus Indices. We find here that risk is nonlinearly 
related to Focus Indices, and the convexity of the shape of the curves suggests that the initial in-
crease of the Focus Indices from zero (completely diversified) to a small number tends to be posi-
tively correlated with risk, but after a certain point, the increase of Focus Indices tends to be nega-
tively related to risk. Based on statistics from Table 12, the threshold where the Focus Index is usu-
ally positively correlated with risk ranges from 0.28 to 0.56. Figure 5-B plots the marginal effects of 
Focus Indices on risk against foreign ownership based on statistics reported in Table 12. The graph 
shows that, except for asset portfolio diversification, the changes in foreign ownership have only a 
modest effect on the marginal effects of Focus Indices on risk. In other words, foreign ownership 
does not seem to play a big role in affecting how focus strategy and risk are related, with one the 
exception of the asset portfolio. For the Asset Focus Index curve, it is clear that an increase in for-
eign ownership tends to intensify the marginal effects (in absolute value terms) of the focus strategy 
on risk. 
 
5.5  Simultaneous equations of bank risk and focus 
 
Similar to the framework of Section 5.3, which serves as robustness tests for Tables 8 and 9, we 
also estimate a system of simultaneous equations (estimated by Seemingly Unrelated Regressions) 




1 , 4 1 , 3 1 , 2 1 , 1 , t i t i t i t i t i foreign foreign FI FI risk
 
t i t i t i t i z foreign foreign , , 1 , 6 1 , 5 ) 1 (
                                    …(15) 
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Table 13 presents the results of the simultaneous model estimations where we trace the ef-
fects of the Focus Indices on risk, with the correction for endogeneity of diversification choices. 
The first regression in each simultaneous estimation is specified by equation (15), while the second 
regression is specified by equation (16). Comparing the results in this table with those in Table 12, 
we conclude that, in general, our results are robust to the potential endogenous bias of the diversifi-
cation decision on the risk of the banks.  
In addition to the robustness tests of the potential bias of the endogeneity issue in the d i-
versification decisions of Russian banks, we also conduct robustness tests in which we replace vola-
tility by other proxies for bank risk in all the regressions. The other proxies for risk that we consider 
are the non-performing loans-to-total assets ratio (an ex ante measure) and the loan loss provisions 
ratio (an ex post measure). In general, we find that our results are robust to alternative risk mea s-
ures. These tables will be provided on request.  
 
 
6  Conclusions 
 
The past decade has witnessed rapid movement of financial institutions around the world towards 
greater diversity of products and services. Since the recent financial crisis brought an unprecedented 
spate of bank failures on a global scale, the issue of banks’ optimal diversification strategy has 
gained renewed attention among legislators, regulators, practitioners, and academics.  
The existing studies on banking diversification, however, tend to oversimplify the analysis 
by assuming a linear relationship between diversification strategy and performance. Moreover, the 
existing studies tend to concentrate on banking industries of developed economies and largely ig-
nore the banks in emerging economies. This paper strives to fill the gap in the literature by investi-
gating the relationship between diversification strategies and the risk-return tradeoff in the banking 
industry of Russia. In recent years, the Russian economy has been marked by robust growth, a rap-
idly expanding banking sector, and a more favorable regulatory/legislative environment. In addi-
tion, lower barriers for foreign investment and cross-border acquisitions not only heightened com-
petition in the domestic market, but also upgraded the Russian banking sector within an integrated 
global market. All these factors might have compelled Russian banks to change or to contemplate 
restructuring their asset-liability strategies.   Allen N. Berger, Iftekhar Hasan, Iikka Korhonen and  
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Based on a large sample of Russian banks over the period 1999-2006, we find that per-
formance tends to be nonmonotonically related with diversification strategy, and the marginal ef-
fects of the focus indices on banks’ performance are also nonlinearly associated with the level of 
risk and foreign ownership. Specifically, we find that the banks tend to enjoy higher profits and 
lower risk when they move from a complete diversification strategy towards less diversification. 
However, the benefit of being less diversified tends to be negated when the extent of focus exceeds 
a certain threshold. Further, we find that the diversification strategy tends to have a stronger impact 
on performance when banks operate at higher risk level. As for the role of foreign ownership, our 
results suggest that there is a range of foreign ownership in which banks benefit most from being 
focused. When foreign ownership is very high or very low, banks tend to benefit more from being 
diversified.   
We also offer some explanations for our results. First of all, agency costs of banking insti-
tutions have been regarded as relatively high in Russia, as this country has yet to develop its institu-
tional environment, including rule of law, creditors’ rights, transparency of the market and banks 
(e.g., Perotti and Gelfer (2001)). The lack of market discipline and monitoring, along with usually 
high transaction costs in emerging markets (in forms of bribery and corruption), means that manag-
ers of the Russian banks may not always be motivated to pursue the diversification strategy that 
maximizes shareholder value. In other words, the Russian banks do not always face effective mar-
ket discipline or are not always actively monitored by shareholders who have voting rights and/or 
controlling rights. Under such circumstances, bank managers can be either entrenched and/or moti-
vated to pursue empire building, and in both cases diversification strategies can be value-decreasing 
rather than value-increasing. Such failures in corporate governance can happen for several reasons. 
First, dominance by a few of the largest state-owned banks in the market might dampen their man-
agers’ motivation to pursue optimized portfolio management, while they can be easily rewarded by 
monopolistic or oligopolistic positions in both financial and nonfinancial terms (see Gilbert (1984), 
Neumark and Sharpe (1992), De Bandt and Davis (2000), Fungacova and Weill (2009) for discus-
sions of the effect of market structure on bank behavior).
10  Second, the strong ties between the 
state-owned or state-controlled banks and (central or local) government can di stort the market-
discipline for bank managers, and they might be given more incentive to follow the government 
policies or “pet projects” instead of conducting independent analysis of the projects when allocating 
their portfolios (see La Porta et al. (2002), Sapienza (2004), Berger et al. (2005) for discussions of 
                                                 
10 Nonfinancial rewards to managers of the largest banks might be, for example, the chance to be promoted to a higher 
position (or even a political career), reputation, "elite" social status, etc.  
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the effect of state ownership on the behavior of banks).  In addition, the opaqueness of Russian 
banking practices, coupled with the corruption and bribery that plague the country, also contributes 
to the challenge that the Russian banks must meet in order to achieve efficiency in portfolio alloca-
tion (see Lerner and Schoar (2005), Beck et al. (2006), Weill (2009), Haselmann et al. (2010) for 
discussions of corruption and bank behavior).
11  
We hope our empirical analysis of  Russian banks provides some insight on the issue of 
how bank diversification strategies affect performance in a broader perspective. Some aspects of the 
macroeconomic environment, characteristics, and practices of Russian banking industry are not 
only shared by other emerging economies, but also tend to have a greater influence on the global 



















                                                 
11 For example, Transparency International (2009) ranks countries’ according to peoples’ perceptions of their corruption 
level, and in recent years Russia has received very poor rankings. In 2009, Russia was ranked 146th (of 180 countries), 
on par with poor developing countries such as Zimbabwe. Allen N. Berger, Iftekhar Hasan, Iikka Korhonen and  
Mingming Zhou  
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 Table 1 Russian banking industry  
Table 1 presents the total number of banking institutions by various types in each year from 1999 to 2006.  The information provided in this table is from the Central Bank 
of Russia.    
Variables  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Total Number of:    
-- Credit Institutions Registered  2,113  2,124  2,001  1,817  1,653  1,507  1,404  1,344 
-- Banks Registered  2,073  2,084  1,953  1,764  1,600  1,455  1,351  1,291 
-- Banks with License to Operate   1,274  1,274  1,276  1,282  1,278  1,246  1,199  1,138 
-- Banks with Ability to take Household Deposits   1,238  1,239  1,223  1,201  1,189  1,162  1,026  921 
-- Banks with the ability to Conduct Business in Foreign Currency  769  764  810  844  846  839  826  754 
-- State Banks  34  34  34  34  34  32  31  31 
-- Banks with Minimum Foreign Stake (>1%)  130  130  126  122  128  128  136  153 
-- Foreign Banks (100%)  23  22  23  27  32  34  42  52 
-- Majority Foreign Banks (over 50% ownership)  12  11  12  10  9  9  11  15 
-- Banking License Cancelled  677  806  677  477  321  212  155  159 
-- Branches  3,765  3,433  3,793  3,308  3,218  3,233  3,297  3,286 
Bank Asset to GDP Ratio  33.3  33.4  35.3  38.3  42.3  41.9  45.1  52.4 Table 2 Summary statistics of observations and bank assets by year, location, amount of assets, and foreign ownership 
 
Table 2 shows the distribution of our sample across year, location, size, and foreign ownership. Panel A displays the distribution of our sample in terms of total observations, while Panel B presents the 
distribution of our sample in terms of total assets. Assets are in thousands of rubles and inflation-adjusted to the price level of year 1996. 
Panel A: Total observations of sample Russian banks across year, grouped by location and size 
   1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  All years 
Total observations  1,302  1,293  1,304  1,321  1,321  1,245  1,201  1,010  9,997 
By location:  
     Moscow  382  389  399  418  429  413  410  393  3,233 
     St. Petersburg  30  30  30  30  30  30  30  28  238 
     Other locations  890  874  875  873  862  802  761  589  6,526 
By size (in millions of rubles) 
     Assets ≤ 10  142  81  66  49  35  17  7  4  401 
     10 < assets ≤ 100  536  431  352  317  246  182  118  49  2,231 
     100 < assets ≤1,000  493  579  622  618  611  586  533  384  4,426 
     1,000 < assets ≤ 10,000  110  177  227  296  371  383  437  433  2,434 
     10,000 < assets ≤ 100,000  19  23  32  36  51  69  93  113  436 
     Assets > 100,000  2  2  5  5  7  8  13  27  69 
By foreign ownership 
     Foreign ownership =0  1,220  1,209  1,221  1,239  1,238  1,161  1,121  932  9,341 
     0 < foreign ownership ≤ 0.25  20  20  17  16  15  15  14  13  130 
     0.25 < foreign ownership ≤ 0.50  21  21  20  20  21  20  17  14  154 
     0.50 < foreign ownership ≤ 0.75  7  7  7  7  6  6  7  5  52 
     0.75 < foreign ownership ≤ 1  34  36  39  39  41  43  42  46  320 
 
Panel B: total assets (in millions of rubles) of sample Russian banks across year, grouped by location and size 
 
1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  All years 
All observations  1,327,155  2,097,468  2,872,131  3,796,751  5,223,668  6,659,524  9,088,661  13,000,000  44,065,358 
     (percentage)  (100%)  (100%)  (100%)  (100%)  (100%)  (100%)  (100%)  (100%)  (100%) 
By location:  
     Moscow  969,482  1,533,873  2,120,532  2,863,291  3,922,985  5,005,732  6,618,089  9,753,006  32,786,990 
     (percentage)  (73.05%)  (73.13%)  (73.83%)  (75.41%)  (75.10%)  (75.17%)  (72.82%)  (75.02%)  (74.41%) 
     St. Petersburg  135,844  197,920  264,609  327,847  448,938  626,540  974,071  1,253,012  4,228,780 
     (percentage)  (10.24%)  (9.44%)  (9.21%)  (8.63%)  (8.59%)  (9.41%)  (10.72%)  (9.64%)  (9.60%) 
     Other locations  221,829  365,675  486,990  605,613  851,745  1,027,252  1,496,501  1,993,982  7,049,588 
     (percentage)  (16.71%)  (17.43%)  (16.96%)  (15.95%)  (16.31%)  (15.43%)  (16.47%)  (15.34%)  (16.00%) 
By size (in thousands of rubles) 
     Assets ≤10  739  358  332  234  173  97  32  19  1,985 
     (percentage)  (0.06%)  (0.02%)  (0.01%)  (0.01%)  (0.00%)  (0.00%)  (0.00%)  (0.00%)  (0.00%) 
     10 < assets ≤ 100  23,987  19,871  16,725  16,358  12,316  9,646  6,389  2,678  107,969 
     (percentage)  (1.81%)  (0.95%)  (0.58%)  (0.43%)  (0.24%)  (0.14%)  (0.07%)  (0.02%)  (0.25%) 
     100 < assets ≤ 1,000  160,168  202,286  230,836  242,949  251,378  255,895  241,445  188,732  1,773,689 
     (percentage)  (12.07%)  (9.64%)  (8.04%)  (6.40%)  (4.81%)  (3.84%)  (2.66%)  (1.45%)  (4.03%) 
     1,000 < assets ≤ 10,000  294,487  469,479  596,913  841,862  1,146,771  1,159,674  1,275,040  1,387,137  7,171,362 
     (percentage)  (22.19%)  (22.38%)  (20.78%)  (22.17%)  (21.95%)  (17.41%)  (14.03%)  (10.67%)  (16.27%) 
     10,000 < assets ≤ 100,000  475,384  742,135  787,827  1,028,172  1,360,807  1,827,787  2,360,128  3,144,146  11,726,386 
     (percentage)  (35.82%)  (35.38%)  (27.43%)  (27.08%)  (26.05%)  (27.45%)  (25.97%)  (24.19%)  (26.61%) 
     Assets > 100,000  372,391  663,340  1,239,498  1,667,177  2,452,223  3,406,425  5,205,626  8,277,287  23,283,967 
     (percentage)  (28.06%)  (31.63%)  (43.16%)  (43.91%)  (46.94%)  (51.15%)  (57.28%)  (63.67%)  (52.84%) 
By foreign ownership 
     Foreign ownership =0  745,646  1,231,906  1,700,797  2,220,453  3,105,618  3,848,558  5,390,887  7,727,621  41,919,107 
     (percentage)  (56.18%)  (58.73%)  (59.22%)  (58.48%)  (59.45%)  (57.79%)  (59.31%)  (59.44%)  (95.13%) 
     0 < foreign ownership ≤ 0.25  392,925  581,848  807,114  1,120,864  1,519,923  2,027,749  2,591,807  3,677,175  1,449,645 
     (percentage)  (29.61%)  (27.74%)  (28.10%)  (29.52%)  (29.10%)  (30.45%)  (28.52%)  (28.29%)  (3.29%) 
     0.25 < foreign ownership ≤ 0.50  35,153  73,055  94,559  100,442  186,683  242,839  331,782  85,692  141,490 
     (percentage)  (2.65%)  (3.48%)  (3.29%)  (2.65%)  (3.57%)  (3.65%)  (3.65%)  (0.66%)  (0.32%) 
     0.50 < foreign ownership ≤ 0.75  1,551  3,427  4,143  5,485  10,446  16,062  25,095  101,624  18,175 
     (percentage)  (0.12%)  (0.16%)  (0.14%)  (0.14%)  (0.20%)  (0.24%)  (0.28%)  (0.78%)  (0.04%) 
     0.75 < foreign ownership ≤ 1  151,879  207,232  265,518  349,507  400,998  524,316  749,090  1,407,888  536,942 
     (percentage)  (11.44%)  (9.88%)  (9.24%)  (9.21%)  (7.68%)  (7.87%)  (8.24%)  (10.83%)  (1.22%) Table 3 Summary statistics of firm-level characteristics variables 
Panel A of Table 3 presents the summary statistics of pre-tax ROA, total expenses to total assets, volatility of quarterly 
earnings, nonperforming loans to total assets, net provisions to total assets, foreign ownership, and capital ratio. Panel B of 
Table 3 displays the summary statistics of the disaggregated components in asset, loan, liability, and deposit portfolios. All 
financial items are in thousands of rubles and inflation-adjusted to the price level of year 1996. 
Panel A:  Summary statistics of firm-level characteristics variables 
   Obs  Mean  Median  Std. D.  Min  Max 
Pre-tax ROA (pre-tax profit to total assets)  9988  0.023  0.143  0.017  -13.209  1.532 
Total expenses/total assets  9988  0.078  0.065  0.066  0.002  0.403 
Volatility of quarterly earnings  9703  0.018  0.007  0.131  0.000  11.413 
Nonperforming loans/total assets  9988  0.012  0.002  0.041  0.000  0.984 
Net provisions/total assets  9965  -0.008  -0.004  0.040  -1.090  1.437 
Foreign ownership  9997  0.043  0.000  0.183  0.000  1.000 
Capital ratio (total capital to total assets)  9976  0.294  0.230  0.209  0.000  2.235 
Panel B:  Decomposition of asset, loan, liability, and deposit portfolios 
   Obs  Mean  Median  Std. D.  Min  Max 
Asset Portfolios                   
Total assets (in thousands of rubles)  9988  4411.179  55027.570  357.786  0.158  3475808 
     % of assets in government securities  9988  2.59%  7.13%  0.00%  0.00%  88.70% 
     % of assets in total loans  9988  73.93%  17.86%  77.21%  5.18%  100.00% 
     % of assets in promissory notes  9988  6.28%  9.05%  2.00%  0.00%  79.96% 
     % of assets in foreign assets  9988  2.88%  7.13%  0.00%  0.00%  87.83% 
     % of assets in other assets  9988  14.31%  15.40%  10.99%  0.00%  94.30% 
Loan Portfolios:                   
Total loans (in thousands of rubles)  9988  3071.333  39786.010  262.628  0.009  2655671 
     % of loans to other banks  9988  36.41%  26.51%  29.45%  0.00%  100.00% 
     % of loans to government  9988  0.85%  3.86%  0.00%  0.00%  86.87% 
     % of loans to firms and entrepreneurs  9988  53.17%  26.12%  57.84%  0.00%  100.00% 
     % of loans to individuals  9988  9.56%  14.49%  4.00%  0.00%  99.85% 
     % of loans to foreigners  9988  0.01%  0.04%  0.00%  0.00%  0.96% 
Liability Portfolios                   
Total liabilities (in thousands of rubles)  9982  3797.528  49540.480  251.352  0.000  3143617 
     % of liabilities in total deposits  9982  85.29%  17.66%  91.36%  0.00%  100.00% 
     % of liabilities in non-bond debt securities  9982  10.26%  13.89%  4.61%  0.00%  99.01% 
     % of liabilities in bond issued  9982  0.16%  2.40%  0.00%  0.00%  98.63% 
     % of foreign liabilities  9982  0.81%  2.29%  0.06%  0.00%  44.48% 
     % of other liabilities  9982  3.47%  11.59%  0.46%  0.00%  100.00% 
Deposit Portfolios:                   
Total deposits (in thousands of rubles)  9961  3281.801  45647.060  210.846  0.000  2930779 
     % of deposits in correspondent accounts  9961  4.57%  14.50%  0.00%  0.00%  100.00% 
     % of deposits in interbank account  9961  8.18%  16.66%  0.00%  0.00%  100.00% 
     % of deposits by government  9961  1.77%  7.06%  0.00%  0.00%  99.50% 
     % of deposits by firms  9961  62.13%  26.54%  64.30%  0.00%  100.00% 
     % of deposits by individuals  9961  23.33%  21.67%  17.72%  0.00%  100.00% Table 4 Summary statistics of economics of diversification measures for asset, loan, liabilities and deposit portfolios  
Table 4 presents the summary statistics for profit premium and cost discount measured by economics of diversification for 
asset, loan, liability and deposit portfolios. The decomposition of each portfolio is defined as in Table 3. Profit premium is 
defined as the proportional difference in predicted profits between the observed diversified bank and the corresponding 
hypothetical quasi-focused bank, given the same total output, whereas the hypothetical quasi-focused bank is defined in our 
paper as a bank which focuses on one product while maintaining the production of other products at the minimal level. Cost 
discount is defined as the proportional difference in predicted costs between a hypothetical quasi-focused bank and the 
observed diversified bank. 
Panel A: Summary Statistics of Profit Premium 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Profit premium of asset diversification  9961  -0.145  -0.110  0.262  -0.619  0.588 
     --- assets in government securities  9961  -0.220  -0.245  0.236  -0.797  0.517 
     --- assets in total loans  9961  -0.134  -0.028  0.128  -0.822  0.543 
     --- assets in promissory notes  9961  -1.181  -0.717  0.170  -1.449  0.221 
     --- assets in foreign assets  9961  -0.140  -0.148  0.197  -1.177  0.538 
     --- assets in other assets  9961  -0.115  -0.198  0.494  -1.068  0.237 
Profit premium of loan diversification  9555  -0.204  -0.189  0.268  -0.798  0.254 
     --- loans to other banks  9555  -0.264  -0.499  0.206  -0.934  0.620 
     --- loans to government  9555  -0.230  -0.201  0.158  -0.705  0.987 
     --- loans to firms and entrepreneurs  9555  -0.014  -0.032  0.106  -0.254  0.579 
     --- loans to individuals  9555  -0.413  -0.400  0.134  -0.399  0.883 
     --- loans to foreigners  9555  -0.374  -0.332  0.159  -0.334  0.064 
Profit premium of liability diversification  9961  -0.091  -0.008  0.127  -0.334  0.301 
     --- liabilities in total deposits  9961  -0.092  -0.056  0.112  -0.218  0.933 
     --- liabilities in non-bond debt securities  9961  -0.136  -0.138  0.160  -0.817  0.840 
     --- liabilities in bond issued  9961  -0.059  -0.505  0.349  -0.732  0.649 
     --- foreign liabilities  9961  -0.095  -0.083  0.151  -0.174  0.693 
     --- other liabilities  9961  -0.068  -0.075  0.364  -0.140  0.546 
Profit premium of deposit diversification  9961  -0.379  -0.345  0.322  -0.795  0.301 
     --- deposits in correspondent accounts  9961  -0.271  -0.218  0.327  -0.750  0.779 
     --- deposits in interbank account  9961  -0.330  -0.355  0.140  -0.647  0.535 
     --- deposits by government  9961  -0.343  -0.364  0.129  -0.623  0.017 
     --- deposits by firms  9961  -0.409  -0.461  0.180  -0.536  0.304 
     --- deposits by individuals  9961  -0.350  -0.295  0.174  -0.960  0.665 
Panel B: Summary Statistics of Cost Discount 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Cost discount of asset diversification  9961  0.215  0.203  0.139  -0.537  0.651 
     --- assets in government securities  9961  0.048  0.046  0.033  -0.232  1.130 
     --- assets in total loans  9961  0.186  0.177  0.069  -0.280  1.669 
     --- assets in promissory notes  9961  0.252  0.283  0.142  -0.389  1.196 
     --- assets in foreign assets  9961  0.370  0.384  0.103  -0.790  1.022 
     --- assets in other assets  9961  0.208  0.200  0.169  -1.300  1.981 
Cost discount of loan diversification  9555  0.006  0.008  0.025  -0.067  0.064 
     --- loans to other banks  9555  0.027  0.027  0.035  -0.097  0.956 
     --- loans to government  9555  0.003  0.001  0.003  -1.866  1.110 
     --- loans to firms and entrepreneurs  9555  0.017  0.013  0.032  -0.130  0.828 
     --- loans to individuals  9555  0.002  0.006  0.008  -0.383  0.962 
     --- loans to foreigners  9555  0.008  0.008  0.003  -1.860  0.021 
Cost discount of liability diversification  9961  0.046  0.048  0.067  -0.151  0.238 
     --- liabilities in total deposits  9961  0.039  0.039  0.086  -0.528  1.890 
     --- liabilities in non-bond debt securities  9961  0.048  0.050  0.034  -0.425  1.121 
     --- liabilities in bond issued  9961  0.065  0.096  0.023  -1.626  1.091 
     --- foreign liabilities  9961  0.037  0.036  0.011  -0.111  1.695 
     --- other liabilities  9961  0.021  0.023  0.012  -0.661  1.898 
Cost discount of deposit diversification  9961  0.014  0.011  0.031  -0.101  0.092 
     --- deposits in correspondent accounts  9961  0.015  0.016  0.090  -0.124  0.585 
     --- deposits in interbank account  9961  0.002  0.008  0.057  -0.330  0.348 
     --- deposits by government  9961  0.016  0.017  0.055  -0.368  0.152 
     --- deposits by firms  9961  0.015  0.009  0.031  -0.234  0.235 
     --- deposits by individuals  9961  0.010  0.012  0.062  -0.494  0.218 Table 5  OLS regressions of economies of diversification (profit premium) on firm-level characteristics 
Table 5 presents the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of profit economies of diversification (i.e., profit premium) on risk (proxied by volatility of quarterly bank 
earnings), foreign ownership (a continuous variable representing the ratio of total shares owned by foreign individuals and/or institutional to total shares of the bank), their 
quadratic terms as well as interaction terms, and control variables, including a location dummy ‘Moscow and St. Petersburg’ (equal to 1 if the bank’s headquarters are in 
Moscow or St. Petersburg, 0 otherwise), capital ratio (total capital to total assets), ln(assets) (natural log of total assets of the bank, where assets are denominated in 
thousands of rubles). Year dummies for 2000 to 2007 are included in all regressions. The profit premiums in columns 1 – 3, 4 – 6, 7 – 9, 10 – 12 are calculated based on 
decomposition of asset, loan, liability and deposit portfolios, respectively, and these decompositions follow the definitions for the previous tables. Absolute values of t 
statistics are presented in brackets.  *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
   Dependent Variable: Profit Premium (Economies of Diversification in terms of pre-tax profits) 
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Observations  8296  8242  8242     8296  8242  8242     8296  8242  8242     8290  8236  8236 
F-statistics  63.19  57.67  51.8 
 
70.39  64.22  57.54 
 
184.25  168.02  144.57 
 
335.54  304.88  262.03 
R-square  0.08  0.08  0.08 
 
0.09  0.09  0.09 
 
0.20  0.20  0.20 
 
0.31  0.31  0.31 
Adj R-square  0.08  0.08  0.08     0.08  0.08  0.09     0.20  0.20  0.20     0.31  0.31  0.31 Table 6  OLS regressions of economies of diversification (cost discount) on firm-level characteristics 
Table 6 presents the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of cost economies of diversification (i.e., cost discount) on risk (proxied by volatility of quarterly bank 
earnings), foreign ownership (a continuous variable representing the ratio of total shares owned by foreign individuals and/or institutions to total shares of the bank), , 
their quadratic terms as well as interaction terms, and control variables including a location dummy ‘Moscow and St. Petersburg’ (equals to 1 if the bank’s headquarter is 
located in Moscow or St. Petersburg, 0 otherwise), capital ratio (the ratio of total capital to total assets), ln(assets) (natural log of total assets of the bank, where assets are 
denominated in thousands of rubles).  Year dummies of 2000 to 2007 are included in all regressions.  The cost discounts in columns 1-3, 4-6, 7-9, 10-12 are calculated 
based on decomposition of asset, loan, liability and deposit portfolios, respectively, and these decompositions follow the definitions as described in the previous tables.  
Absolute values of t statistics are presented in brackets.  *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Observations  8296  8242  8242     8296  8242  8242     8296  8242  8242     8296  8242  8242 
F-statistics  224.83  206.76  178.74 
 
50.98  46.98  40.48 
 
102.51  93.27  80.18 
 
107.43  97.95  84.03 
R-square  0.23  0.23  0.23 
 
0.06  0.06  0.06 
 
0.12  0.12  0.12 
 
0.12  0.12  0.13 
Adj R-square  0.23  0.23  0.23     0.06  0.06  0.06     0.12  0.12  0.12     0.12  0.12  0.12 Table 7 Summary statistics of Focus Indices of asset, loan, liability, and deposit portfolios 
Table  7  presents  the  summary  statistics  of  Focus  Indices,  and  decompositions  of  asset,  loan,  liability,  and  deposit 
portfolios by location and by size.  The definitions of Focus Indices are described in equation (7), and the definitions of 
asset, loan, liability and deposit portfolio decomposition remain as in previous tables. 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
All observations 
Asset Focus Index  9988  0.647  0.639  0.172  0.226  1.000 
Loan Focus Index  9988  0.579  0.538  0.168  0.276  1.000 
Liability Focus Index  9982  0.804  0.846  0.171  0.307  1.000 
Deposit Focus Index  9926  0.621  0.566  0.204  0.223  1.000 
Summary statistics of Focus Indices by location: 
Banks with headquarters in Moscow 
Asset Focus Index  3229  0.622  0.607  0.185  0.226  1.000 
Loan Focus Index  3229  0.584  0.548  0.170  0.294  1.000 
Liability Focus Index  3226  0.772  0.784  0.175  0.307  1.000 
Deposit Focus Index  3206  0.613  0.567  0.210  0.246  1.000 
Banks with headquarters in St. Petersburg 
Asset Focus Index  238  0.625  0.615  0.177  0.316  1.000 
Loan Focus Index  238  0.568  0.533  0.137  0.310  0.976 
Liability Focus Index  238  0.730  0.733  0.154  0.402  0.994 
Deposit Focus Index  238  0.568  0.522  0.198  0.248  1.000 
Banks with headquarters in other cities/regions 
Asset Focus Index  6521  0.659  0.651  0.163  0.227  1.000 
Loan Focus Index  6521  0.578  0.533  0.168  0.276  1.000 
Liability Focus Index  6518  0.823  0.875  0.167  0.320  1.000 
Deposit Focus Index  6482  0.627  0.568  0.201  0.223  1.000 
Summary statistics of Focus Indices by size: 
Banks with total assets less than 10,000 rubles 
Asset Focus Index  401  0.686  0.651  0.175  0.354  1.000 
Loan Focus Index  401  0.689  0.613  0.235  0.320  1.000 
Liability Focus Index  399  0.873  0.955  0.158  0.376  1.000 
Deposit Focus Index  377  0.826  0.932  0.201  0.340  1.000 
Banks with total assets between 10,000 and 100,000 rubles 
Asset Focus Index  2231  0.668  0.658  0.167  0.265  1.000 
Loan Focus Index  2231  0.593  0.539  0.182  0.276  1.000 
Liability Focus Index  2229  0.837  0.921  0.175  0.335  1.000 
Deposit Focus Index  2204  0.711  0.696  0.205  0.251  1.000 
Banks with total assets between 100,000 and 1,000,000 rubles 
Asset Focus Index  4426  0.657  0.653  0.170  0.226  1.000 
Loan Focus Index  4426  0.565  0.527  0.159  0.294  1.000 
Liability Focus Index  4424  0.806  0.846  0.169  0.320  1.000 
Deposit Focus Index  4415  0.618  0.568  0.193  0.247  1.000 
Banks with total assets between 1,000,000 and 10,000,000 rubles 
Asset Focus Index  2434  0.617  0.609  0.172  0.227  1.000 
Loan Focus Index  2434  0.573  0.549  0.150  0.325  1.000 
Liability Focus Index  2434  0.776  0.801  0.165  0.329  1.000 
Deposit Focus Index  2434  0.541  0.505  0.169  0.247  1.000 
Banks with total assets between 10,000,000 and 100,000,000 rubles 
Asset Focus Index  436  0.565  0.547  0.167  0.262  1.000 
Loan Focus Index  436  0.590  0.570  0.159  0.364  1.000 
Liability Focus Index  436  0.723  0.710  0.160  0.307  1.000 
Deposit Focus Index  436  0.488  0.452  0.164  0.223  1.000 Table 8  OLS regressions of pre-tax ROA on focus indices, risk, and foreign ownership 
Table 8 presents the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of pre-tax return on assets on Focus Indices (as defined in Table 7), risk (proxied by volatility of quarterly bank 
earnings) and foreign ownership (a continuous variable representing the ratio of total shares owned by foreign individuals and/or institutions to total shares of the bank), their 
quadratic terms as well as their interaction terms, and control variables including a location dummy ‘Moscow and St. Petersburg’ (equals 1 if the bank’s headquarters are in 
Moscow or St. Petersburg, 0 otherwise), capital ratio (total capital to total assets), ln(assets) (natural log of total assets of the bank, where assets are denominated in thousands 
of rubles). Year dummies for 2000 to 2007 are included in all regressions. The Focus Index in the first three columns represents the asset Focus Index, and the same Focus 
Index is also used to construct the interaction terms between Focus Indices and other variables. The Focus Indices in columns 4-6, 7-9, and 10-12 represent loan Focus Index, 
liability Focus Index, and deposit Focus Index. Absolute values of t statistics are presented in brackets.  *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively. 
   Pre-tax Profit/Total Assets 





***  0.008  0.007  0.016






































[18.93]  [18.27] 
 
[18.14]  [17.44] 
 
[18.72]  [17.93] 
 
[18.81]  [17.69] 
Focus Index, lagged  0.002
**  0.003  0.005  0.003
**  0.025  0.025  0.006
























[2.18]  [2.37] 
 
[2.47]  [2.56] 
 
[2.36]  [2.31] 
 
[3.31]  [3.36] 
Foreign, lagged  0.004
**  -0.001  -0.137
***  0.001
**  -0.025
*  -0.061  0.003























[2.19]  [2.69] 
 
[1.77]  [1.59] 
 
[2.30]  [2.04] 
 
[2.28]  [4.72] 


















[2.93]  [4.27] 
 
[2.66]  [4.51] 
 
[4.07]  [5.49] 
 
[3.98]  [6.30] 
(Focus Index, lagged)×Volatility
2 
   
-0.040
*** 
   
-0.043
*** 
   
-0.053
*** 
   
-0.063
*** 
   
[3.49] 
   
[3.86] 
   
[4.33] 
   
[5.31] 
(Focus Index, lagged)×(Foreign, 
















[2.03]  [2.66] 
 
[2.27]  [2.05] 
 
[1.81]  [1.37] 
 
[3.80]  [5.52] 
(Focus Index, lagged)×(Foreign, 
lagged)
2     
-0.241
*** 
   
-0.081
** 
   
-0.005
** 
   
-0.379
*** 
   
[2.78] 
   
[2.13] 
   
[2.06] 
   
[5.06] 
(Focus Index, 
lagged)×Volatility×(Foreign, lagged)     
0.189
*** 
   
0.074
** 
   
0.129
** 
   
0.105
* 
   
[2.64] 
   
[2.15] 
   
[2.29] 
   
[1.69] 













[3.91]  [4.03]  [4.08]  [4.35]  [4.40]  [4.46]  [3.72]  [3.97]  [4.07]  [3.89]  [4.22]  [4.37] 
Capital ratio  0.010




***  0.004  0.004  0.010
***  0.004  0.004
* 
[3.84]  [1.37]  [1.42]  [4.12]  [1.73]  [1.69]  [3.94]  [1.44]  [1.37]  [3.78]  [1.48]  [1.66] 
ln(assets)  0.001  0.001
*  0.001
**  0.001  0.001
**  0.001
***  0.001  0.001
**  0.001
***  0.001  0.001
**  0.001
*** 
[0.22]  [1.84]  [2.20]  [1.10]  [2.45]  [2.74]  [0.81]  [2.46]  [2.76]  [0.29]  [2.35]  [2.93] 
year dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Observations  8296  8242  8242  8248  8212  8212  8290  8241  8241  8296  8242  8242 
F-statistics  56.26  63.88  55.96  54.66  60.92  52.88  56.57  65.07  56.95  56.24  66.17  59.88 
R-square  0.08  0.12  0.12  0.07  0.11  0.11  0.08  0.12  0.12  0.08  0.12  0.13 
Adj R-square  0.07  0.11  0.12  0.07  0.11  0.11  0.07  0.12  0.12  0.07  0.12  0.13 Table 9 OLS regressions of total expenses/total assets on focus indices, risk, and foreign ownership 
Table 9 presents ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of total expenses/total assets on Focus Indices (defined as in Table 7), risk (proxied by volatility of quarterly bank 
earnings) and foreign ownership (a continuous variable representing the ratio of total shares owned by foreign individuals and/or institutional to total shares of the bank), their 
quadratic terms as well as their interaction terms, and control variables including a location dummy ‘Moscow and St. Petersburg’ (equal to 1 if the bank’s headquarters are in 
Moscow or St. Petersburg, 0 otherwise), capital ratio (total capital to total assets), ln(assets) (natural log of total assets of the bank, where assets are denominated in thousands 
of rubles). Year dummies for 2000 to 2007 are included in all regressions. The Focus Index in the first three columns represents the asset Focus Index, and the same Focus 
Index is used to construct the interaction terms between Focus Indices and other variables. The Focus Indices in columns 4-6, 7-9, and 10-12 represent loan Focus Index, 
liability Focus Index, and deposit Focus Index. Absolute values of t statistics are presented in brackets.  *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively. 
   Total Expenses/Total Assets 
















































[9.42]  [9.54] 
 
[9.07]  [9.04] 
 
[9.37]  [9.60] 
 
[9.01]  [9.05] 










***  0.020  0.023 




















[7.84]  [7.69] 
 
[5.92]  [5.76] 
 
[8.33]  [8.32] 
 
[2.34]  [2.41] 




***  0.021  -0.045  0.013
***  0.065
























[2.68]  [2.36] 
 
[2.30]  [1.75] 
 
[2.05]  [1.85] 
 
[2.79]  [1.75] 


















[1.76]  [2.83] 
 
[2.43]  [2.14] 
 
[1.88]  [3.59] 
 
[2.12]  [2.48] 
(Focus Index, lagged)×Volatility
2 
   
0.032
** 
   
0.02
** 
   
0.045
*** 
   
0.024
* 
   
[2.17] 
   
[2.40] 
   
[2.89] 
   
[1.69] 
(Focus Index, lagged)×(Foreign, 










**  -0.072 
 
0.016
**  -0.077 
 
[2.11]  [1.74] 
 
[1.98]  [1.85] 
 
[2.20]  [0.72] 
 
[1.93]  [0.85] 
(Focus Index, lagged)×(Foreign, 
lagged)
2     
0.192
* 
   
0.142
*** 
   
0.048
** 
   
0.091
* 
   
[1.75] 
   
[2.57] 
   
[2.44] 
   
[1.96] 
(Focus Index, lagged)× 
Volatility×(Foreign, lagged)     
0.134
* 
   
0.142
* 
   
0.150
** 
   
0.145
* 
   
[1.77] 
   
[1.74] 
   
[2.10] 
   
[1.77] 













[14.25]  [13.47]  [13.49]  [11.76]  [11.42]  [11.46]  [14.51]  [14.26]  [14.24]  [13.91]  [13.74]  [13.73] 



























[18.58]  [17.58]  [17.73]  [24.94]  [24.14]  [24.10]  [19.34]  [19.83]  [20.00]  [18.02]  [17.65]  [17.73] 
year dummies  yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Observations  8296  8242  8242  8248  8212  8212  8290  8241  8241  8296  8242  8242 
F-statistics  96.16  77.59  66.46  136.16  103.95  88.74  97.92  79.42  68.13  100.02  76.26  65.11 
R-square  0.12  0.14  0.14  0.17  0.18  0.18  0.12  0.14  0.14  0.13  0.14  0.14 
Adj R-square  0.12  0.14  0.14  0.16  0.18  0.18  0.12  0.14  0.14  0.13  0.13  0.13 Table 10 Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) I: Effects of focus on pre-tax ROA with correction of endogeneity of diversification choices 
This table presents the results for the test of whether the focus-performance relationship found in Table 8 (i.e., the OLS regressions of pre-tax ROA) are subject to the endogenous choice of diversification. A simultaneous 
equations system is specified to correct for the endogeneity of focus measures, i.e., Focus Indices.  The specification is a simultaneous system estimated by seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) of equations (a) and (b), as 
specified in equations 16 and 17. Panel A of this table presents the SUR regressions of pre-tax ROA on asset Focus Index (leftmost three paired columns) and loan Focus Index (rightmost three paired columns). Panel B of 
Table 10 presents the SUR regressions of pre-tax ROA on liability Focus Index (leftmost three paired columns) and deposit Focus Index (rightmost three paired columns). The definitions of variables are the same as in the 
previous tables. Year dummies for 2000 to 2007 are included in all regressions. Absolute values of t statistics are presented in brackets.  *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 













   ROA  A-FI     ROA  A-FI     ROA  A-FI 
 























[7.90]  [66.96] 
 
[2.82]  [66.70] 
 
[3.01]  [0.01] 
 
[10.35]  [46.25] 
 
[7.26]  [45.84] 
 
[7.66]  [45.84] 
Volatility  0.204
*** 
   
0.479
*** 
   
0.466
*** 
   
0.203
*** 
   
0.473
*** 
   
0.449
*** 
  [24.16] 
   
[28.20] 
   
[27.01] 
   
[24.04] 
   
[27.93] 




     
-0.197
*** 
   
-0.191
*** 
         
-0.195
*** 




     
[18.86] 
   
[18.19] 
         
[18.71] 
   
[17.56] 
  Volatility, lagged 
 
-0.035 
   
-0.095
* 
   
-0.100
* 
   
0.102
*** 
   
0.260
*** 





   
[1.75] 
   
[1.85] 
   
[3.64] 
   
[4.97] 




       
0.045 
   
0.050 
         
-0.126
*** 
   
-0.129
*** 
       
[1.24] 
   
[1.35] 
         
[3.56] 
   
[3.64] 
Focus Index, lagged  0.005
** 
   
0.005 
   
0.006 
   
0.002
*** 
   
-0.059
*** 
   
-0.062
*** 
  [1.98] 
   
[0.26] 
   
[0.32] 
   
[2.63] 
   
[3.39] 
   
[3.57] 
  (Focus Index, lagged)
2 
     
-0.001
** 
   
-0.003
** 
         
-0.041
*** 




     
[2.06] 
   
[2.21] 
         
[3.02] 
   
[2.98] 




0.001  0.077 
 
-0.130













[1.92]  [4.29] 
 
[0.02]  [1.64] 
 
[2.48]  [1.64] 
 
[1.75]  [3.33] 
 
[1.96]  [2.69] 
 
[5.23]  [2.69] 
(Foreign, lagged)
2 
















     
[2.23]  [2.61] 
 
[2.57]  [2.61] 
       
[2.23]  [3.44] 
 
[4.65]  [3.44] 
(Focus Index, 
lagged)×Volatility       
0.026
*** 
   
0.078
*** 
         
0.037
*** 




     
[2.78] 
   
[4.04] 
         
[4.00] 
   
[6.18] 
  (Focus Index, lagged) 
×Volatility
2             
-0.038
*** 




           
[3.31] 
               
[5.16] 
  (Focus Index, lagged) 
×(Foreign, lagged)       
0.001
** 
   
0.207
** 
         
0.050
*** 




     
[2.07] 
   
[2.53] 
         
[3.77] 
   
[5.42] 
  (Focus Index, lagged) 
×(Foreign, lagged)
2             
-0.229
*** 




           
[2.65] 
               
[4.96] 
  (Focus Index, lagged)× 
Volatility× (Foreign, lagged)             
0.191
*** 




           
[2.68] 
               
[1.67] 



















[4.07]  [10.51] 
 
[0.47]  [10.64] 
 
[0.38]  [10.65] 
 
[4.41]  [16.04] 
 
[0.74]  [15.76] 
 
[0.72]  [15.75] 













***  0.001 
 
-0.004
***  0.001 
 
-0.004
***  0.001 
[3.88]  [5.39] 
 
[3.48]  [5.43] 
 
[3.41]  [5.44] 
 
[4.01]  [0.33] 
 
[3.60]  [0.36] 
 





   
-0.011
*** 
   
-0.011
*** 
   
0.003
*** 
   
0.004
*** 





   
[9.72] 
   
[9.73] 
   
[2.89] 
   
[3.15] 
   
[3.14] 
year dummies  yes  yes 
 
yes  yes 
 
yes  yes 
 
yes  yes 
 
yes  yes 
 
yes  Yes 
Observations  8242  8242     8242  8242     8242  8242     8242  8242     8242  8242     8242  8242 
R
2 for Equation 1  0.08 
   
0.12 
   
0.12 
   
0.08 
   
0.12 
   
0.13 
  R
2 for Equation 2 
 
0.07 
   
0.07 
   
0.07 
   
0.05 
   
0.05 
   
0.05 
Breusch-Pagan Chi
2  9.36        7.77        7.37        1.69        1.82        2.35    
 
  













   ROA  B-FI     ROA  B-FI     ROA  B-FI 
 
ROA  D-FI     ROA  D-FI     ROA  D-FI 
Constant  0.017
***  0.001 
 
0.019
*  0.001 
 
0.017
*  0.001 
 
0.021







***  0.001 
[5.84]  [0.01] 
 
[1.88]  [0.01] 
 
[1.77]  [0.01] 
 
[10.05]  [0.01] 
 
[2.93]  [75.10] 
 
[2.98]  [0.01] 
Volatility  0.204
*** 
   
0.475
*** 
   
0.460
*** 
   
0.197
*** 
   
0.461
*** 
   
0.447
*** 
  [24.17] 
   
[27.91] 
   
[26.66] 
   
[23.58] 
   
[27.27] 




     
-0.194
*** 
   
-0.188
*** 
         
-0.187
*** 




     
[18.62] 
   
[17.83] 
         
[18.09] 
   
[17.38] 
  Volatility, lagged 
 
0.006 
   
-0.083 
   
-0.083 
   
0.132
*** 
   
0.188
*** 





   
[1.58] 
   
[1.57] 
   
[4.05] 
   
[3.07] 




       
0.070
** 
   
0.070
** 
         
-0.047 
   
-0.046 
       
[1.97] 
   
[1.96] 
         
[1.15] 
   
[1.12] 
Focus Index, lagged  0.006
** 
   
0.004 
   
0.005 
   
0.003
** 
   
0.021 
   
0.021 
  [2.27] 
   
[0.13] 
   
[0.19] 
   
[2.43] 
   
[1.35] 
   
[1.34] 
  (Focus Index, lagged)
2 
     
-0.001
** 
   
-0.002
** 
         
-0.015
** 




     
[2.00] 
   
[2.09] 
         
[2.28] 
   
[2.38] 




-0.023  0.024 
 
-0.021  0.024 
 
0.002








[2.32]  [13.01] 
 
[1.35]  [0.52] 
 
[0.33]  [0.52] 
 
[1.65]  [0.72] 
 
[1.66]  [4.20] 
 
[1.49]  [4.20] 
(Foreign, lagged)2 
















     
[2.26]  [2.40] 
 
[2.06]  [2.39] 
       
[1.81]  [4.44] 
 
[2.50]  [4.44] 
(Focus Index, lagged) 
×Volatility       
0.040
*** 
   
0.099
*** 
         
0.023
*** 




     
[3.96] 
   
[5.28] 
         
[2.60] 
   
[4.34] 
  (Focus Index, lagged) 
×Volatility
2             
-0.051
*** 




           
[4.15] 
               
[3.69] 
  (Focus Index, lagged) 
×(Foreign, lagged)       
0.032
* 
   
0.028
** 
         
0.003
** 
   
0.062 
 
     
[1.92] 
   
[2.36] 
         
[2.24] 
   
[0.95] 
  (Focus Index, lagged) 
×(Foreign, lagged)
2             
-0.002
** 




           
[2.03] 
               
[2.02] 
  (Focus Index, lagged)× 
Volatility× (Foreign, 
lagged) 
           
0.131
** 




           
[2.33] 
               
[2.14] 











***  -0.001 
 
0.002  -0.002 
 
0.002  -0.002 
[4.27]  [10.78] 
 
[0.55]  [10.71] 
 
[0.36]  [10.71] 
 
[4.12]  [0.05] 
 
[0.84]  [0.18] 
 
[0.71]  [0.18] 























[3.58]  [9.30] 
 
[3.37]  [9.23] 
 
[3.37]  [9.24] 
 
[4.20]  [10.39] 
 
[3.74]  [10.46] 
 





   
-0.029
*** 
   
-0.029
*** 
   
-0.046
*** 
   
-0.046
*** 





   
[26.24] 
   
[26.24] 
   
[36.08] 
   
[35.91] 
   
[35.92] 
year dummies 
                                  Observations  8241  8241     8241  8241     8241  8241     8206  8206     8206  8206     8206  8206 
R
2 for Equation 1  0.08 
   
0.12 
   
0.12 
   
0.07 
   
0.11 
   
0.11 
  R
2 for Equation 2 
 
0.14 
   
0.14 
   
0.14 
   
0.18 
   
0.18 
   
0.18 
Breusch-Pagan Chi
2  0.06        0.05        0.04        0.57        0.74        0.44    Table 11 Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) II: Effects of focus on total expenses/total assets with correction of endogeneity of diversification choices 
 
This table presents the results for the test of whether the focus-performance relationship found in Table 9 (i.e., the OLS regressions of total expenses/total assets) are subject to the endogenous choice of diversification. A 
simultaneous equations system is specified to correct for the endogeneity of focus measures, i.e., Focus Indices. The specification is a simultaneous system estimated by seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) of equations (a) 
and (b) as specified in equations 16 and 17 and replacing the dependent variable by the cost ratio. Panel A of this table presents the SUR regressions of total expenses/total assets on asset Focus Index (leftmost three paired 
columns) and loan Focus Index (rightmost three paired columns). Panel B of Table 10 presents the SUR regressions of total expenses/total assets on liability Focus Index (leftmost three paired columns) and deposit Focus 
Index (rightmost three paired columns). The definitions of variables are same as in the previous tables. Year dummies for 2000 to 2007 are included in all regressions. Absolute values of t statistics are presented in brackets.  
*, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 













   ROA  A-FI     ROA  A-FI     ROA  A-FI 
 












***  0.001 
 
0.085





[25.48]  [67.33] 
 
[0.59]  [67.11] 
 
[1.60]  [67.11] 
 
[32.17]  [0.01] 
 
[11.84]  [0.01] 
 
[12.72]  [45.80] 
Volatility  0.073
*** 
   
0.278
*** 
   
0.280
*** 
   
0.078
*** 
   
0.269
*** 
   
0.268
*** 
  [6.77] 
   
[12.69] 
   
[12.54] 
   
[7.29] 
   
[12.25] 




     
-0.142
*** 
   
-0.142
*** 
         
-0.135
*** 




     
[10.53] 
   
[10.48] 
         
[10.04] 
   
[9.89] 
  Volatility, lagged 
 
-0.041 
   
-0.106
* 
   
-0.105
* 
   
0.104
*** 
   
0.263
*** 





   
[1.95] 
   
[1.94] 
   
[3.72] 
   
[5.03] 




       
0.053 
   
0.053 
         
-0.129
*** 
   
-0.129
*** 
       
[1.45] 
   
[1.44] 
         
[3.63] 
   
[3.63] 
Focus Index, lagged  -0.006
* 
   
0.210
*** 
   
0.209
*** 
   
-0.031
*** 
   
-0.032 
   
-0.030 
  [1.90] 
   
[8.55] 
   
[8.52] 
   
[8.11] 
   
[1.40] 
   
[1.31] 
  (Focus Index, lagged)
2 
     
-0.164
*** 
   
-0.163
*** 
         
-0.001
** 




     
[8.89] 
   
[8.82] 
         
[2.04] 
   
[2.12] 






















[2.08]  [4.21] 
 
[1.79]  [1.65] 
 
[1.80]  [1.65] 
 
[2.51]  [3.33] 
 
[1.78]  [2.69] 
 
[1.01]  [2.69] 
(Foreign, lagged)2 















     
[2.59]  [2.60] 
 
[1.90]  [2.60] 
       
[2.88]  [3.44] 
 
[1.24]  [3.44] 
(Focus Index, lagged) 
×Volatility       
-0.015
** 
   
-0.035
** 
         
-0.006
** 




     
[2.22] 
   
[2.43] 
         
[2.49] 
   
[2.14] 
  (Focus Index, lagged) 
×Volatility
2             
0.013
* 




           
[1.85] 
               
[2.28] 
  (Focus Index, lagged) 
×(Foreign, lagged)       
0.006
** 
   
-0.132 
         
0.021
** 
   
-0.022 
 
     
[2.31] 
   
[2.25] 
         
[2.23] 
   
[2.23] 
  (Focus Index, lagged) 
×(Foreign, lagged)
2             
0.144
** 




           
[2.29] 
               
[2.39] 
  (Focus Index, lagged)× 
Volatility× (Foreign, 
lagged) 
           
0.129
** 




           
[2.39] 
               
[2.54] 























[4.10]  [10.33] 
 
[3.32]  [10.45] 
 
[3.35]  [10.45] 
 
[5.16]  [16.02] 
 
[3.36]  [15.77] 
 
[3.38]  [15.77] 













***  0.001 
 
-0.028
***  0.001 
 
-0.028
***  0.001 
[21.48]  [5.22] 
 
[20.35]  [5.25] 
 
[20.40]  [5.25] 
 
[21.29]  [0.34] 
 
[21.23]  [0.35] 
 





   
-0.012
*** 
   
-0.012
*** 
   
0.003
*** 
   
0.004
*** 





   
[10.23] 
   
[10.24] 
   
[2.86] 
   
[3.19] 
   
[3.19] 
year dummies 
                                  Observations  8242  8242     8242  8242     8242  8242     8242  8242     8242  8242     8242  8242 
R
2 for Equation 1  0.08 
   
0.11 
   
0.11 
   
0.09 
   
0.10 
   
0.10 
  R
2 for Equation 2 
 
0.07 
   
0.07 
   
0.07 
   
0.05 
   
0.05 
   
0.05 
Breusch-Pagan Chi
2  5.07        5.31        5.54        0.03        0.00        0.00    













   ROA  B-FI     ROA  B-FI     ROA  B-FI 
 
ROA  D-FI     ROA  D-FI     ROA  D-FI 
Constant  0.069
***  0.001 
 










***  0.001 
 
0.048
***  0.001 
[19.43]  [0.01] 
 
[0.70]  [0.01] 
 
[0.70]  [106.76] 
 
[31.75]  [78.03] 
 
[5.97]  [0.01] 
 
[7.19]  [0.01] 
Volatility  0.071
*** 
   
0.271
*** 
   
0.275
*** 
   
0.080
*** 
   
0.279
*** 
   
0.278
*** 
  [6.58] 
   
[12.28] 
   
[12.27] 
   
[7.61] 
   
[12.90] 




     
-0.139
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Breusch-Pagan Chi
2  11.82        10.77        10.89        158.67        154.88        153.76    Table 12 OLS regressions of risk on focus indices and foreign ownership 
Table 12 presents the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of risk (proxied by volatility of quarterly earnings) on Focus Indices, foreign ownership, their quadratic 
terms as well as interaction terms, and control variables including a location dummy ‘Moscow and St. Petersburg’ (equal to 1 if the bank’s headquarters are in Moscow or 
St. Petersburg, 0 otherwise), capital ratio (total capital to total assets), one-year lag of pre-tax ROA, ln(assets) (natural log of total assets of the bank, where assets are 
denominated in thousands of rubles). The Focus Index in the first three columns represents the asset Focus Index, and the same Focus Index is also used to construct the 
interaction terms between Focus Indices and other variables. The Focus Indices in column 4-6, 7-9, and 10-12 represent loan Focus Index, liability Focus Index, and 
deposit Focus Index. The definitions of variables are the same as in the previous tables. Year dummies for 2000 to 2007 are included in all regressions. Absolute values of 
t statistics are presented in brackets.  *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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year dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Observations  8296  8296  8296  8296  8296  8296  8290  8290  8290  8248  8248  8248 
F-statistics  19.26  16.24  15.27  22.58  19.49  18.65  20.43  16.81  15.76  20.1  16.54  15.58 
R-square  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03 
Adj R-square  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03 Table 13 Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) III: Effects of focus on risk with correction of endogeneity of diversification choices 
This table presents the results for the test of whether the focus-risk relationships found in Table 12 (i.e., the OLS regressions of risk) are subject to the endogenous choice of 
diversification. A simultaneous equations system is specified to correct for the endogeneity of focus measures, i.e., Focus Indices. The specification is a simultaneous system 
estimated by seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) of equations (a) and (b), as specified in equations 19 and 20. Panel A of this table presents the SUR regressions of risk on 
asset Focus Index (leftmost three paired columns) and loan Focus Index (rightmost three paired columns). Panel B of Table 13  presents the SUR regressions of total 
expenses/total assets on liability Focus Index (leftmost three paired columns) and deposit Focus Index (rightmost three paired columns). The definitions of variables are same 
as in the previous tables. Year dummies for 2000 to 2007 are included in all regressions. Absolute values of t statistics are presented in brackets.  *, **, and *** represent 
significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Figure 1-A: Plot of profit premium against risk (volatility), 
based on the statistical results of Table 5 
 
 
Figure  1-B:  Plot  of  profit  premium  against  foreign 






Figure  2-A:  Plot  of cost  discount  against  risk  (volatility), 
based on statistical results of Table 6 
 
 
Figure 2-B: Plot of cost discount against foreign ownership, 
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pre-tax  ROA  against  risk  (volatility),  based  on  statistical 
results of Table 8. 
 
 
Figure 3-B: Plot of the marginal effects of Focus Indices on 
pre-tax ROA against foreign ownership, based on statistical 
results of Table 8. 
 
 
Figure 4-A: Plot of the marginal effects of Focus Indices on 
cost ratio (total expenses-to-total assets ratio) against risk 
(volatility), based on statistical results of Table 9. 
 
Figure 4-B: Plot of the marginal effects of Focus Indices on 
cost  ratio  (total  expenses-to-total  assets  ratio)  against 
foreign ownership, based on statistical results of Table 9. 
 
 
Figure 5-A: Plot of the risk (volatility) against Focus Indices, 




Figure 5-B: Plot of the marginal effects of Focus Indices on 
risk  (volatility)  against  foreign  ownership,  based  on 
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